

ROUTINE

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\* U N C L A S S I F I E D \*  
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FM CNET PENSACOLA FL

TO NAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI

BT

UNCLAS //NO1000//

OPNAV FORM (1000/4A)

A. OPNAVINST 1000.16C

1. THE FOLLOWING ALLOCATION OF STUDENT BILLETS FOR ALL USN NAVWARCOL COURSES BY FY IS AS FOLLOWS:

FY 75	FY 76	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79
<u>250</u>	<u>260</u>	<u>270</u>	<u>280</u>	<u>280</u>

2. IAW REF A, REQUEST YOU SUBMIT REORGANIZED OPNAV FORM 1000/4A REFLECTING QUALITY FOR QUANTITY OF STUDENT BILLETS ADDRESSED IN PARA 1.

BT

#0966

NNNN

DIST: NAVWARCOL

COPIES: 23

16/282

NAVY  
Declassification/Release  
Instructions on File

ACT	INFO
PRES	✓
DEP	✓
C/S	
ENC	
SEC	✓
AD/TS	✓
OFF/CL	✓
AM	✓
J & S	
SEC	
SEC	
SEC	
2/2	

ROUTINE

✓ Item 1 - Curriculum Changes

Strategy

Term paper

Nuclear policy Asia

✓ Defense Economics

✓ Too much contemporary historical cases

✓ Speakers

Tactics

Too much current tactics

Speakers

✓ Item 2 - Grading

Strategy - practice exam

Security of exams

Open vs closed

A,B,C,F

School solution answers

Specific instruction

*Student Feedback*  
*Numerical*  
*Failures*

Item 6 - Faculty Enrichment Programs

✓ Item 7 -

3 courses?

TAD adequate test?

✓ Item 8 -

Expunge "integration"

Poor English students withdraw during Strategy?

✓ Item 9 -

How faculty feel on extra work load?

✓ Item 10 -

Not stated properly

What thrust in:

Strategy

Theories/theorists

IR

Contemporary

More cases

Deeper in same cases

Defense Economics

More current data

Write case studies

More quantitative?

Tactics

Fleet exercises

Item 12 -

Beavers -

If exert will with nuc's, will not survive as a  
viable nation

✓ Item 14 -

Electives for Superiors only?

14 January 1974

NAVAL MISSIONS

(Paper prepared for Tactics curriculum of the Naval War College - to be refined for presentation to CNO Executive Panel and for publication in Naval War College Review)

PRECIS

In 1970, with the end of the Vietnam conflict in sight, a new CNO undertook a searching review into the purposes of-- and reasons for--a Navy. From this introspective inquiry emerged the definition of four "Navy Mission Areas" - strategic deterrence, sea control, projection of power, and presence - which contained all the elements of why and how naval forces are vital to the United States today and tomorrow.

Historically, broad concepts of seapower and control of the sea have led to the creation of navies. The unique character of the newly defined naval mission areas, however, permits explicit and knowledgeable formulation of specific naval plans and programs in support of strategies.

Essentially, the four naval mission areas are performance functions--the end products which the nation can and should expect its Navy to accomplish. Assessment of present and future Navy programs in terms of end products - sea control, projection, etc., - has proved to be a vastly more objective process than concentrating on input categories--

manpower, aircraft carriers, destroyers, amphibious ships, and submarines. Thinking in platform input parameters is simply not very useful to a naval officer, a Congressman, a Defense official or a taxpayer when considering why we want a Navy, how much of a Navy, and what a Navy should do.

In planning strategy, generating procurement programs, and developing tactics, it is absolutely vital that the U.S. Navy closely understand its missions and objectives. With the exception of strategic deterrence forces, most Navy units are broadly multi-purpose in character. Aircraft carriers contribute to the sea control and presence missions as well as the projection mission, and destroyers are useful to the projection mission as well as the sea control and presence missions. This interrelationship becomes even more clear if one breaks down each mission area into its components. Included in the sea control mission, for example, are the counter roles of sea control assertion and sea control denial. Each of these roles can be further reduced to tasks such as sortie denial, choke point attrition, open area search and attack, and local defense.

Accordingly, the aggregate naval forces of a nation says something--or should say something--about that nation's naval strategies, objectives, and capabilities. Naval mission area planning simplifies the choices that

a nation must make in developing naval programs in the proper balance to match its national objective priorities.

Perhaps more significantly, thinking in terms of the four naval mission areas is the most promising approach to the issues which lie ahead. What level of assertive sea control, and what kinds of forces, will be required to safeguard U.S. interests in the most likely conflict scenarios? How much sea control capability is essential to maintain a credible projection potential? What is the optimum trade-off balance between larger numbers of moderately capable forces and smaller numbers of very capable forces--the "Hi-Lo Mix?" Which strategies, employment concepts, and tactics will maximize performance of the naval forces selected? How should the presence mission be accomplished in the light of varying perceptions by different nations, in different tension/conflict circumstances.

In short, the introduction of naval mission area planning has made it possible to apply all the tools of intellect, reason, and analysis to the resolution of the most difficult problems confronting the Navy--today and tomorrow. Comprehensive understanding of the four naval mission areas is a fundamental sector of the professional knowledge of every naval officer.

14 January 1974

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# MISSIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY

## Strategic Deterrence

- ASSURED SECOND STRIKE
- CONTROLLED RESPONSE
- DETER THIRD POWERS
- BALANCE OF POWER IMAGE

## Sea Control (Assertive Control/Sea Denial)

- SORTIE CONTROL
- CHOKE POINT CONTROL
- OPEN AREA OPERATIONS
- LOCAL ENGAGEMENT
- ~~DECEPTION~~
- ~~INTIMIDATION~~

## Projection of Power Ashore

### AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

- MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
- MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE
- MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT
- RAID

### NAVAL BOMBARDMENT

- DIRECT
- INDIRECT

### TACTICAL AIR

- DEEP INTERDICTION
- BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION
- CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
- COUNTERAIR/ANTI-AIR

## Naval Presence

- PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENTS
- REACTIVE DEPLOYMENTS

A

B

<u>RANK/NAME</u>	<u>DESIG</u>	<u>DESIG</u>	<u>BILLET</u>			<u>DESIG</u>	<u>ETA</u>
			<u>RANK</u>	<u>PRD</u>	<u>RELIEF</u>		
<u>OFFICE OF PRESIDENT</u>							
LCDR D.G. CLARK	1110	1110	LCDR	8/74			
<u>OFFICE OF DEPUTY</u>							
LCDR D.L. SCHNEIDER	1310	1300	LCDR	Gone	LCDR E.J. LISCHKE	1310	Stu
<u>STRATEGY</u>							
LTJG C.L. SYMONDS	1105	1000	CDR	9/74	CDR W.L. STEVENS	1310	Stu
<u>MANAGEMENT</u>							
CDR J.L. CARENZA	3100	3100	CDR	7/74	CAPT D.W. WHELAN	3100	8/74
CAPT R.V. HANSEN	1310	Excess		1/75	None	-	-
Empty		1000	CDR		(Shift incumbent to TAC as KREKEL's relief)	-	-
<u>TACTICS</u>							
CAPT C.K. MOORE	1110	1110	CAPT	6/74			
CAPT Wm. ABROMOTIS	1110	1000	CAPT	7/74	CDR J.F. McNULTY	1110	Stu
CDR L.E. KREKEL	1110	1120	CDR	6/74	CDR C.P. HAMMON	1310	Note
CDR W.G. CARSON	1110	1100	CDR	6/74	CDR L.R. EDWARDS	1310	Stu
CDR R.C. KEMPFR	1110	1110	LCDR	Gone	CDR H.B. KUYKENDALL	1110	Stu
CDR L.T. FUREY	1110	Excess		7/74	None	-	-
CDR C.P. PFARRER	1110	Excess		7/74	None	-	-
CDR D.R. MAHER	1110	Excess		7/74	None	-	-

Note: Internal shift by HAMMON.

<u>COMMAND AND STAFF</u>							
CDR J.H. GRAHAM	1310	Excess		7/74	None	-	-
<u>NCC</u>							
CAPT C.O. BORGSTROM	1310	1000	CAPT	8/74			
CAPT W.K. MALLINSON	1110	1000	CAPT	5/74			
LCDR H.D. STURR	1820	1820	CDR	10/74	Pers nom		

NSC

CDR R.K. LOCKWOOD	1110	1110	CDR	6/74	CDR J.A. MAJOR	1110	Stu
LCDR J.A. MORIARTY	1310	3100	LCDR	9/74	LCDR L. ANDERSON	3100	8/74
LCDR J.A. LOFTUS	1110	1110	LCDR	7/74	LCDR E.L. GIBSON	1110	Stu

ADMIN

CDR J.B. MOORE	1630	1630	LCDR	7/74	LCDR G.C. STEIGER	1630	Stu
CDR T.J. MORAN	1310	Excess		6/74	None		
CDR C.F. AKE	1110	1100	LCDR	7/74	CDR L.L. ALLEY	1110	5/74

CCE

CDR R.C. TRAUZ	1310	1300	CDR	11/74	CDR E.F. ROLLINS	1310	Stu
CDR D.C. FAUL	3100	3100	LCDR	8/74	LCDR J.L. SMITH	3100	9/74
LCDR R.F. BECKHAM	1110	1100	LCDR	7/74	LCDR J.S. TURNER	1110	6/74

CWG

CDR R.N. BLATT	1310	1000	CDR	9/74			
CDR C.W. BUZZELL	1310	1000	CDR	7/74			
LCDR R.T. DAVIS	1310	1110	LCDR	Gone	LCDR B.V. TIERNAN	1110	
LCDR G.E. KOUBA	1110	1110	LCDR	4/74	LCDR C. CRIGLER	1110	
LCDR P.R. JACOBS	1310	1310	LCDR	7/74			
Empty		1310	LCDR	-	LT P.P. GUTELIUS	1110	4/74
LCDR J.D. SHEWCHUK	1110	1110	LCDR	8/74	LCDR A.M. RYBARCZYK	1110	8/74
Billet Being Established		1000	CDR	-	CDR R.D. LONGMAN	1110	4/74

(HUMAN RESC. MGMT)

SUMMARY

<u>BILLETS</u>	<u>ALLOWED</u>	<u>ON BOARD</u>	<u>LOSSES</u>	<u>GAINS</u>	<u>FUTURE</u>
CAPT	25	25	5	1	21
CDR	42	57	15	8	50
LCDR	28	24	11	9	22
LT-ENS	8	13	1	1	13
TOTALS	103	119	32	19	106

Total billets allowed will be increased by one CDR on establishment of Human Resources Management.

	CAPT				CDR				ICDR				LT-ENS		TOTALS
	1000	11XX	13XX	Other	1000	11XX	13XX	Other	11XX	13XX	Other	11XX	13XX	Other	
PRES															
On Bd															
DEP															
On Bd															
STRAT															
On Bd															
MCMT															
On Bd															
IAC															
On Bd															
CNW															
On Bd															
C&S															
On Bd															
NCC															
On Bd															
NSC															
On Bd															
ADMIN															
On Bd															
CCE															
On Bd															
CMG															
On Bd															
RSC															
On Bd															
Total	18	3	2	2	18	10	8	6	17	7	4	7	1	1	103
Total	13	10	2	2	29	20	8	3	12	9	3	13			119
(All 1554)	25				42				28			8			103
Desig	25				57				24			13			119





DRAFT

CNO Letterhead

Dear Duke,

On the 4th of December I indicated in a letter to you my support for your efforts to foster a broader association with the Washington area academic community. Since then I have had an opportunity to give your program more thought and, quite frankly, have developed some reservations. Although your PROTAP Program has many attractive features, it also presents problems worthy of further consideration.

First, upon review of the ten disciplines identified as PROTAP areas of study, I notice only Political Science relates to validated Navy billet requirements. There are only 80 P-coded billets in the Navy in Political Science and, of those, only 58 are identified for 05/06 officers.

Second, the cost of detailing officers for an extra four months to a Senior Service College to participate in PROTAP appears to me to not be a very effective way of spending money, especially in view of the limited Navy need for officers with graduate work or degrees in the ten disciplines of PROTAP.

Third, your successor's hands may be tied by having to maintain the National War College curriculum in consonance with the participating consortium of Washington area universities. It seems to me that it would be

DRAFT

difficult to expand or modify the National War College curriculum while involved in PROTAP, since, presumably, the participating consortium universities would have to base a considerable amount of their degree credit upon the National War College course.

Finally, I worry a bit about the subtle pressures that the PROTAP Program may exert on our officers to pursue advanced degrees as points for promotion rather than because they want or need education for professional reasons.

No doubt you have weighed these, and other, arguments and may be able to persuade me that my doubts are not well founded. Accordingly, I will look forward to hearing from you on this matter.

Warm regards,

E.R. ZUMWALT, JR.  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Vice Admiral M.G. Bayne, U.S. Navy  
Commandant, The National War College  
Washington, DC 20319

D

14 January 1974

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E



PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, Rhode Island  
02840

22 FEB 1974

Dear Dr. Krogh,

It certainly was good to hear that you have managed to pin down a speaker for the Nash Lecture after all the trouble you have had. Mr. Bundy should provide us with some exciting and provocative ideas.

Your schedule of events for that evening - from the "academic sherry" to the reception and dinner - are very enticing. I shall plan to attend and look forward to a pleasant and stimulating evening. Further, I am fairly certain that some of my staff will be interested in attending. Your assistant can get in touch either directly with me or with my aide, Lieutenant Commander Dave Clark, to make specific arrangements.

Again thanks for the good news. Warm regards.

Yours,



STANSFIELD TURNER  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Dean Peter F. Krogh  
Georgetown University  
Washington, DC 20007



F

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LECTURE  
NOTICE

G

Mr. David Aaron  
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H



**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND  
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11 April 1974

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL TURNER

SUBJ: Visit to LTG Rogers

1. (O'Brien). Reminder: Father Peterson, PC, never sent the letter I requested and, consequently, O'Brien was assigned to the Army C&GSC, Ft. Leavenworth.

Comment: In all candor, this is an internal Army problem. If you consider it an obligation to bring it up because of O'Brien's telephone call, please be advised that this will cause a fair amount of "flap" and could decrement your leverage vis-a-vis the Robinson case (par 2).

2. (Robinson). Facts: LTC(P) Richard T. Robinson, Corps of Engineers, had been assigned to head up a computer systems office in San Francisco. For that plus a strong personal desire to be stationed there (wife is Japanese) I omitted (with ADM Williams' concurrence) his name on your original list called in to BG Forrest three weeks ago. You will recall that we got McLain as a result. Robinson is now scheduled to be the Plans and Training Officer for the Engineer Training Center, Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo. I tried to break this loose on 9 April through the Colonels' Branch, but without success. We are authorized five Army officers, three colonels and two LTC's. We will have for next year:

COL. McLain (CNW)

COL. Guertin (departs Jan 75)

LTC Whalen (CNW)

MAJ(P) Hogan

LTC Gallup (.99 probable retirement this year. Also our only engineer)

NB LTC Pietsch will be reassigned in July to HQ FORSCOM

3. (Hutton, Cuthbert P.). Facts: He attended the NC&S course of 1971. He was an alternate selectee for a war college this year. The assignment officer added him to the Naval War College list without checking his C&S schooling. Upon re-checking, he deleted Hutton. There is a standing rule that an officer who attends a C&S course at another service will not return to that service's senior service college.

Comment: I'm sure an exception could be made. Hutton would really be in his element with this curriculum.

4. (LTG Rogers). Per instructions from Dave Clark, a CSF invitational letter will be sent (blind) to General Rogers. 2

Comment: Presume you will discuss this with him.

Very respectfully,

*L. W. Jackley*  
L. W. JACKLEY  
COL INF  
Senior Army Advisor





DRAFT

CNO Letterhead

Dear Duke,

On the 4th of December I indicated in a letter to you my support for your efforts to foster a broader association with the Washington area academic community. Since then I have had an opportunity to give your program more thought and, quite frankly, have developed some reservations. Although your PROTAP Program has many attractive features, it also presents problems worthy of further consideration.

First, upon review of the ten disciplines identified as PROTAP areas of study, I notice only Political Science relates to validated Navy billet requirements. There are only 80 P-coded billets in the Navy in Political Science and, of those, only 58 are identified for 05/06 officers.

Second, the cost of detailing officers for an extra four months to a Senior Service College to participate in PROTAP appears to me to not be a very effective way of spending money, especially in view of the limited Navy need for officers with graduate work or degrees in the ten disciplines of PROTAP.

Third, your successor's hands may be tied by having to maintain the National War College curriculum in consonance with the participating consortium of Washington area universities. It seems to me that it would be

DRAFT

difficult to expand or modify the National War College curriculum while involved in PROTAP, since, presumably, the participating consortium universities would have to base a considerable amount of their degree credit upon the National War College course.

Finally, I worry a bit about the subtle pressures that the PROTAP Program may exert on our officers to pursue advanced degrees as points for promotion rather than because they want or need education for professional reasons.

No doubt you have weighed these, and other, arguments and may be able to persuade me that my doubts are not well founded. Accordingly, I will look forward to hearing from you on this matter.

Warm regards,

E.R. ZUMWALT, JR.  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Vice Admiral M.G. Bayne, U.S. Navy  
Commandant, The National War College  
Washington, DC 20319


J

K

## MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

by

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy  
President, Naval War College



INTERDEPENDENT NAVAL MISSIONS

### USEFULNESS OF CATEGORIZING NAVY MISSIONS

Observers of military affairs will have noted a changed naval lexicon over the past several years. To those accustomed to phrases such as "sea power," "command of the seas," "commerce warfare," and "amphibious warfare," the new terms, "Strategic Deterrence," "Sea Control," "Presence," may seem to be just a new jargon. Not so. Since 1970 there has been a re-definition of traditional U.S. Naval roles and missions to force the Navy to think in terms of output rather than input.

Why must we emphasize output? First, because a nation of concerned free citizens and skeptical taxpayers is naturally more interested in what is harvested than in what is

sown. By measuring the value of output in terms of national objectives the country can rationally decide what resources it should allocate to the Navy. Input categories such as manpower, ships, aircraft, and training are of little help in trying to determine why we need a Navy or, if we do need one, how big it should be and what it should be prepared to do.

Second, focusing on missions helps tactical commanders to keep objectives in mind. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) tacticians often overconcentrate on killing submarines when their ultimate objective is to ensure safe maritime operations.

Third, an amorphous mass of men, ships, and weapons is difficult to manage because it is difficult for an individual to visualize. By subdividing these masses into their expected output, or missions, we are able to establish priorities for allocating resources - to know how much we are spending for different objectives, and to judge their consonance with national strategy.

Mission categorization is useful in less abstract decision-making also. For instance, we shall propose that the Sea Control mission is executed by tactics of sortie control (barrier operations), choke point control, open area operations, and local engagement. Different platforms have different utility in each of these tactics. Generally speaking, VP aircraft are best for open area operations; surface escorts best for local

engagement, and submarines best for choke point operations. Although each of these forces has secondary applications, resource distribution among them will be dictated by our evaluation of which tactics are going to be most important to us.

Categorization of mission tactics can also be used at even more detailed levels of resource allocation. A submarine designed for choke point operations should emphasize quietness at the expense of speed; a submarine for local engagement or escort defense needs speed even at the expense of quietness. If we understand this, we will trade off speed versus quietness according to our evaluation of probable employment.

Fourth, an understanding of missions assists in selecting the best among several competing systems. A research program may develop five new air-launched munitions, but we may not be able to afford production of more than three. We shall divide tactical air projection tactics into deep interdiction, battlefield support, close air support, and counter air/anti-air warfare. Each of these makes slightly different demands for weapons. While precision is mandatory for deep interdiction, it is critical in close air support. Surely in our mix of three new weapons we will want at least one that stresses accuracy. If this seems obvious, an examination of history will show that the military has sometimes become hypnotized



by the weapons needed or used in one particular tactic or mission to the neglect of newly emerging requirements.

Finally, stressing missions helps to ensure that members of the organization focus on the whole rather than on one of its parts. This can help keep vested interests in proper perspective. Even the most professional, well-motivated individual can become so committed to a particular missile system, type of ship or aircraft, or special personnel program that he loses sight of what is best for the whole organization.

#### EVOLUTION OF NAVAL CAPABILITIES AND MISSIONS

How did the Navy come to define the four mission areas as Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore, and Naval Presence? It was evolutionary. Navies have not always had each of these missions nor is this likely to be the definitive list of naval missions.

The first and only mission of the earliest navies was Sea Control. A classic example of the importance of being able to move military forces by sea is the Battle of Salamis in 480 BC. The Persian armies had pushed the Greeks to the wall. The Athenian Admiral, Themistocles, turned the tables by soundly defeating the Persian fleet at Salamis. Cut off from reinforcement and resupply, the Persians left Athens and Attica.

A few decades later, in the Peloponnesian Wars, Athenian Sea Control repeatedly permitted outflanking the land-based Spartan campaign. In the Punic Wars, Rome's exercise of Sea Control prevented the Carthaginians from being able to support Hannibal. And so it went. There were many technological milestones, new tactical concepts, and maritime initiatives, but the basic mission of navies was to ensure the safe movement of ground forces and their supplies across the sea.

In time, trade routes flourished, exploration became more far ranging, the horizons of imperialism widened, commerce grew, and with it, piracy. Nations began to demand security for their endeavors. Broad command of the sea became the sine qua non of economic growth and well being. The nature of Sea Control evolved to include the protection of shipping for the nation's economy as well as its overseas military expeditions. By the same token, denial of an enemy's use of the seas for commerce as well as military purposes became an important element of warfare--blockade hurt economies and warmaking potential.

By the early 19th century, another important naval mission had evolved--the projection of ground forces from the sea onto the land. Amphibious warfare in the modern sense began during the Wars of the French Revolution. Ground troops traditionally transported by sea to some staging area began to use sea platforms as combat springboards. A new dimension in tactics was

given to commanders in the Projection of Power Ashore through amphibious assault. This also extended the traditional Sea Control mission. In addition to protecting supply reinforcement and economic shipping, navies now had to protect the amphibious assault force.

Also during the 19th century, the term "gunboat diplomacy" came into the naval vocabulary. In the quest for colonies, nations paraded their naval forces to intimidate and serve warning on one another. In time the range of this activity extended to demonstrations of good will. It has come to be known as the Naval Presence mission. Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore by amphibious means and Naval Presence were the missions of navies through the end of World War II.

During that war, naval tactical air was used primarily in the Sea Control mission (e.g., Midway, Coral Sea, and Battle of the Atlantic) and secondarily in direct support of the amphibious assault mission. When the war ended, however, there was no potential challenger to U.S. Sea Control. In essence, the U.S. Navy had too much of a monopoly to justify a continuing Sea Control mission. It was a Navy in quest of new missions. Two arose.

The innovation in missions came from the final stages of World War II, when naval tactical air power played a role in the bombing of the Japanese home islands. Post-war improvements in aircraft and munitions made it logical to extend this

use of naval air power. The Navy staked out its claim to the use of air power in support of land campaigns; strategic air attack on enemy industry, transportation, and cities; air superiority over the battlefield; and close air support of ground forces. Its value was demonstrated early in the Korean campaign where there were few alternative means of providing air support ashore.

The second innovation in naval missions came with the introduction of Strategic Deterrence as a national military requirement. The combination of improved aircraft performance and smaller packaging of nuclear weapons made the aircraft carrier capable of contributing to this new mission. With the Navy struggling to readjust its missions to peacetime needs and the U.S. Air Force establishing its own place in the military family, it is understandable that there was a sense of competition for this new role. However, by the mid-1960's the development of the Polaris submarine concept eliminated any question of appropriateness of this mission for the Navy.

At about the same time, the dramatic and determined growth of the Soviet naval challenge caused mission priorities to begin to shift and brought about a resurgence of traditional Sea Control requirements. Today, the balance of naval resources and attention devoted to each of these four missions, Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore, and Naval Presence, is especially difficult because of their complex interdependence and because almost all naval forces have multi-mission capabilities.

The distinction between the four missions is primarily one of purpose. Despite these inevitable overlaps and interdependence, we can understand the Navy far better if we carefully examine each mission individually. We must know what each mission's objectives are so that we do not overlook, some useful new tactic or weapon and, so that we can strike the proper balance whenever these missions compete for resources.

DEFINITION OF NAVAL MISSIONS AND DISCUSSION OF THEIR  
FORCES AND TACTICS

Strategic Deterrence Mission

Our strategic deterrence objectives are:

- To deter all-out attack on the United States or its allies;
- to face any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with unacceptable risks; and
- to maintain a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion against the United States or its allies is minimized.

In support of national objectives, we have three principal military "tactics" or force preparedness objectives. The first is to maintain an assured second strike capability in the hope of deterring an all-out strategic nuclear attack on the United States. Today that means dissuading the Soviets from starting a nuclear war. We hope to achieve this by

maintaining a strategic attack force capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on any enemy even after he has attacked us. The Navy's Polaris/Poseidon/Trident forces are fundamental to this deterrence because of their high nuclear survival probability.

A second tactic is to design our forces to ensure that the United States is not placed in an unacceptable position by a partial nuclear attack. If the Soviets attacked only a portion of our strategic forces, would it then make sense for the United States to retaliate by striking Soviet cities, knowing that the Soviets still possessed adequate forces to strike our cities? In these circumstances do we need an alternative of controlled response? This means making our strategic strike forces quickly responsive to changes in targeting and capable of accurate delivery. SSBN forces can be well tailored to these requirements.

A third objective is to deter third powers from attacking the United States with nuclear weapons. Because of the great disparity between any third country's nuclear arsenal and ours, the same forces deterring the Soviet Union should deter others.

Finally, we maintain a quantity and quality of strategic forces which will not let us appear to be at a disadvantage to the Soviet Union or any other power. If we were to allow the opinion to develop that the Soviet strategic position is

markedly superior to ours, we would find that political decisions were being adversely influenced. Thus we must always keep in mind the balance of power image that our forces portray to the non-Soviet world. In part, this image affects what and how much we buy for strategic deterrence. In part, it affects how we talk about our comparative strength and how we criticize ourselves.

In summary, the strategic deterrence mission is sub-divided into four tactics.

S  
T  
R  
A  
T  
E  
R  
G  
I  
E  
C  
N  
C  
E

- Assured Second Strike
- Controlled Response
- Deter Third Powers
- Balance of Power Image

There is very little overlap between strategic deterrence and other Navy mission areas at present. However, significant improvements in enemy ASW technology could reduce the ability of SSBN's to survive without assistance from friendly Sea Control forces. With this exception and the fact that aircraft carriers still possess the potential for nuclear strikes, naval forces for strategic nuclear deterrence are almost exclusively devoted to that mission.

### Sea Control Mission

The term "Sea Control," derives from the traditional phrase "control of the sea." This change in terminology may seem minor, but it is a deliberate attempt to acknowledge the limitations on ocean control brought about by the development of the submarine and the airplane.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, we passed through a period of maritime history in which full regulation of the seas in wartime was the ambition of Great Britain. Initially, this could be accomplished through possession of a superior sailing fleet. The enemy's harbors were closely watched by patrolling cutters and frigates. Ships of the line were called forth to defeat the enemy or at least to force him back into port whenever he dared to sortie. Later, when steam propulsion afforded ships greater mobility, the British found that they needed both coaling stations and control of vital choke points around the world. The intention was still to be able to move a superior fleet into position for a showdown engagement before an enemy had the opportunity to use the seas for his advantage. The term "control of the sea," as used by Mahan, meant both denying use of the seas to the enemy and asserting one's own use.

British and German naval strategies in World War I reflect this heritage. Both navies believed that a decisive encounter of their battle fleets would determine control of



the seas. Hence caution dominated the tactics of Jutland. Germany challenged British reliance on a superior battle fleet by first employing surface ship commerce raiders, then by attempting to blockade the German U-boat with mines layed across the exit to the North Sea. It failed. Few naval strategists understood how radically the concept of "control of the seas" was altered by the advent of the submarine. British, German, Japanese, and American preparations for World War II all concentrated on potential battle fleet actions. Only a few voices pointed out that an additional submarine might be more useful than another battleship or two.

Equally few strategists forecast the dominant role that control of the air over a surface fleet would have. However, in March 1941, off Cape Matapan in Greece, the first engagement of major surface forces since Jutland demonstrated that it was the presence of a British aircraft carrier that allowed an otherwise weaker force to prevail. By the end of World War II the idea of totally denying the seas to one's enemy while asserting one's own exclusive use had been overtaken by technology. On the one hand it was nearly impossible to deny an enemy submarine fleet access to the seas; on the other, there were likely to be areas of the sea where enemy air power would make the assertion of one's presence prohibitively costly. Yet, for the first several decades after the second World War,

the U.S. Navy had such a monopoly on sea power that the term "control of the seas" understandably continued to carry its long established connotation.

The new term "Sea Control" is intended to connote more realistic control in limited areas and for limited periods of time. It is conceivable today to temporarily exert air, surface, and subsurface control in an area while moving ships into position to project power ashore or to resupply overseas forces. It is no longer conceivable, except in the most limited sense, to totally control the seas for one's own use, or to totally deny them to an enemy.

This may change with evolving technology and tactics, but in the meantime, we must approach the use of the term "Sea Control," from two directions: denying an enemy the right to use some seas at some times; and, asserting our own right to use some seas at some times. Any sea power may assert its own right to use the seas and deny that right to the enemy at any given time. Its efforts will usually be divided between the two objectives. For instance, in Figure 1, if the U.S. were attempting in wartime to use the North Atlantic to reinforce Europe, it would be operating near the left side of the diagram with the greater percentage of its effort on asserting sea control. In a situation like the Vietnam War, we operated on the right extreme, since our use of the seas was not challenged, but we did make a substantial effort to

deny the other side access to Haiphong. An opponent, of course, will usually respond with countering objectives and tactics as in the lower half of the figure.




Figure 1

Four U.S. national objectives which call for asserting our use of the sea and by the same token denying them to an opponent are:

- To ensure industrial supplies.
- To reinforce/resupply military forces engaged overseas.
- To provide wartime economic/military supplies to allies.
- To provide safety for naval forces in the Projection of Power Ashore role.

There are four different tactical approaches for achieving these Sea Control objectives:

Sortie Control: Bottling up an opponent in his ports or on his bases can still be attempted. As opposed to the 18th and 19th century tactic of forcing a major fleet engagement at sea, today's blockade seeks destruction of individual units as they sortie. If we assume an opponent will be in

control of the air near his ports, sortie control tactics must primarily depend on submarines and mines.

If successful, sortie control is a most economical means of cutting off a nation's use of the seas or ability to interfere. Nevertheless, such established techniques have their disadvantages. No blockade is 100% successful. Some units may be beyond the blockade when hostilities commence and will remain to haunt opposition forces. Against the enemy's aircraft there is no static defense. Planes must be bombed at their bases. Thus, blockades are weapons of attrition requiring time to be effective. But the lesson of history is perhaps the most instructive of all - ingenious man has usually found ways to circumvent blockades.

Choke point control: Sometimes the best place to engage the enemy is in a geographical bottleneck through which he must pass. In so doing, platforms like ASW aircraft that probably could not survive in the area of the enemy's sortie point can be used. This also requires patience.

For those enemy forces that have cleared sortie and choke point operations, there are two remaining tactics.

Open area operations: Once the enemy is loose at sea or in the air, surveillance and search systems can assist in locating and putting him at bay. Aircraft are perhaps the most appropriate platform because of high search rates. Here again, though, time and patience are required.

Local Engagement: In contrast to searching out a large area, we can let the enemy come to us. If we are asserting our use of the seas, his attacking forces must close ours to within weapon release range. This enables us to concentrate our defensive forces around the units to be protected. These forces may attempt to destroy the enemy's launching platform prior to weapon release or may attempt to deflect, or destroy the attacking weapons themselves. If we are denying use of the seas to someone else, local engagement amounts to positioning forces in a limited region and waiting in prey.

The weapons employed in these four tactics are numerous, their selection depending on timing and the situation. The same weapon may be used to assert our control or to deny control to an opponent. This multimission character of many weapons systems often causes misunderstanding of the boundary between Sea Control and the other naval missions. Figure 2 shows the weapons systems applicable to specific Sea Control tactics.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS APPLICABLE TO SEA CONTROL TACTICS

Weapons Systems	Tactics	Sortie Control	Chokepoint Control	Open Area Operations	Local Defense
Submarines		X	X	X	X
ASW Aircraft			X	X	X
Fighter Aircraft			X		X
Surveillance Systems		X	X	X	X
Attack Aircraft		X	X		
Mines		X	X		
Escort Ships		X	X	X	X


Figure 2

In executing Sea Control tactics, two passive techniques deserve particular mention:

Deception: Assertive Sea Control objectives do not necessarily demand destruction of the enemy's force. If the enemy can be sufficiently deceived to frustrate his ability to press an attack, we will have achieved our Sea Control objective. Force routing, deceptive/imitative devices, and other anti-search techniques can be employed, often in combination with other tactics.

Intimidation: The perceptions of other nations of our Sea Control capability relative to that of other major powers can influence political and military decisions. What any nation says about its capabilities influences the challenges that are offered or accepted.

In summary, Sea Control tactics include:



- Sortie Control
- Chokepoint Control
- Open Area Operations
- Local Engagement
- Deception
- Intimidation

#### Projection of Power Ashore Missions

Sea Control is concerned with what happens on, under, and over the ocean surface. Projection of Power Ashore is concerned with the impact of naval forces on land forces and can be divided

into three categories: amphibious assault, naval bombardment, and tactical air.

Amphibious Assault Projection: Ships have long been used to transport military power to conflict areas. As noted earlier, assault from the sea in the face of opposition began to develop as a naval mission in the early 19th century. The calamitous assault at Gallipoli in 1915 and subsequent failure to distinguish poor execution from good strategy lowered enthusiasm for this mission. However, World War II and the Korean conflict testified to its continuing importance.

Amphibious assaults are opposed landings on hostile territory and have four objectives:

- To secure territory for a land campaign. Assault from the sea is used when there is no other practical approach, that is, the enemy territory is a geographical or political island, or when we want to outflank and surprise the enemy. The Okinawa and the Normandy landings in World War II are examples. The purpose of the assault on Okinawa was to secure a base from which to launch the invasion of Japan. The Normandy assault launched the attack into heartland Germany.

- To secure land area for an air operation. One of the costliest amphibious assaults during World War II was launched against Iwo Jima to gain a site from which the Air Force could strike Japan.

- To secure territory or facilities to prevent enemy use of them. The first offensive action of World War II in the Pacific was the capture of Guadalcanal to deny the Japanese the airfield facilities from which they could interdict U.S. supply routes between Pearl Harbor and Australia.

- To destroy enemy facilities, interrupt his communications, divert his effort, etc., by means of amphibious raids with planned withdrawal.

Amphibious tactics are classified by the size of the operation as indicated in Figure 3.

COMPARISON OF AMPHIBIOUS TASK ORGANIZATIONS

	MAF*	MAB*	MAU*	Raid
Troops	To 33,000	8000-12,000	1800-4000	50-250
Ships	43-52	15-17	4-6	1-2
Helos	250-300	75-120	30-36	10-14
Attack Aircraft	50-60	18-20	6-8**	2-4**
Boats	320-350	80-100	30-40	2-10
Gunfire Support	8-10 8"			
	22-30 5"/54	12-14 5"/54	2-4 5"/54	0-3 5"/54

\*MAF - Marine Amphibious Force

MAB - Marine Amphibious Brigade

MAU - Marine Amphibious Unit

\*\*VTOL

Figure 3

These rough force compositions are by no means rigid. There are many specific ways in which amphibious assault forces can be tailored to the particular requirement at hand. Obviously the landing force must be adequate in size to handle the tasks assigned ashore. As the size of an assault increases, there are two factors that scale upward



more than proportionally to the number of troops to be landed. One is the number of specialized units that are required such as command, control, and communications ships or facilities; minesweeping capability; aircraft and gunfire support. The other factor is the time to assemble, sail, prepare the landing area, and assault. The larger the operation, in short, the more complex it becomes with attendant delays and risks of enemy advance defensive preparations.

Finally, when little or no opposition is encountered, such as in Lebanon in 1958, amphibious forces can be landed "administratively." They can then be employed as regular ground forces if supported. Administrative landings are considered amphibious operations only when the unique over-the-beach capability of amphibious force is an essential element.

Naval Bombardment: Although most commonly associated with amphibious assault, bombardment can have three separate objectives along a coast or in coastal areas:

- To provide direct support to troops

- To interdict movements

- To harass military or civil operations

Bombardment is presently available from naval guns in destroyers and cruisers utilizing the two tactics of either direct or indirect fire control depending on the distance of the ship and target from shore. Targets can be prearranged geographically, called by observers on the beach, or selected visually

from a ship or aircraft. The accuracy of fire can be spotted from on board ship, from ashore, or may also be employed in this role.

Tactical Air Projection: Tactical air power is used to achieve three objectives:

- Destroy portions of the enemy's war-making potential.
- Provide support to a ground campaign directly or by interdicting enemy support to the engaged areas.
- Deny an enemy these same options against us.

The four basic tactics by which these objectives are achieved are: deep interdiction; battlefield interdiction; close air support; and counterair/anti-air warfare.

Deep Interdiction: Attacks conducted to destroy, neutralize, or impair the enemy's military potential before it can be directed against friendly forces are deep interdiction. Targets may be military or civilian, remote from the battle area and perhaps more strategic than tactical. To prevent the enemy from moving forces and material under the protective cover of darkness or adverse weather, an all weather attack capability is important.

Battlefield Interdiction: Sometimes referred to as Direct Air Support (DAS), battlefield interdiction differs from deep interdiction in two ways: targets are usually military and of immediate tactical importance, and air space control must be closely coordinated with front line support

operations. Sustained battlefield interdiction can restrict the enemy's capability to move supplies/reinforcements or maneuver his forces.

Close Air Support: Providing direct support to front line ground forces, close air support is generally exercised in a similar manner as call-fire support from field artillery. Therefore, very close coordination with gunfire support elements is necessary.

Counterair/Anti-air Warfare: In order to conduct the three types of air strike operations, counterair forces are employed to neutralize the enemy's air capabilities, minimizing expected attrition of our forces. The threat over enemy territory may be surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), anti-aircraft guns (AAA) and/or fighter interceptor aircraft. Counters to these range from attack on enemy air bases or weapons sites to direct protection with our fighters or electronic countermeasures. When the situation is reversed, and an opponent is projecting his air power over our territory, anti-air warfare operations employing fighters, SAMS, and AAA exact attrition on enemy aircraft.

All of these tactical air projection tactics are carried out by attack aircraft supported by fighter-interceptor air superiority forces. One of the values of categorizing air projection missions is to identify the aircraft and weapon characteristics and tactics best suited to each mission as in Figure 4.

AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS FOR  
TACTICAL AIR PROJECTION MISSIONS

(H-high; M-medium; L-low)				
	Deep Interdiction	Battlefield Support	Close Air Support	Counterair
<b>Aircraft</b>				
Speed	H	M	L	H
Maneuverability	H	M	H	H
Range	H	M	L	M
Endurance	M	M	H	M
All Weather	H	M	L	M
Sophisticated Weapons				
Delivery System	H	M	M	—
ECM Capability	H	M	L	H
Weapons Payload	H	M	M	—
<b>Weapons</b>				
Long Range	H	M	L	M
Large Warhead	H	M	L	L
Antipersonnel	L	M	H	—
Antimaterial	H	H	H	—
Sophisticated (Smart)	H	M	L	—

Figure 4

There will be specific scenarios where some of the judgmental evaluations in Figure 4 will be incorrect. It would be desirable to be infinitely flexible and have maximum characteristics in all aircraft and weapons. Unfortunately, the laws of both physics and economics prevent that. Hence, some evaluation of probable use and likely need can be valuable.

Before leaving the projection mission, we would note that only a fine distinction separates some aspects of the Sea Control and Projection of Power Ashore missions. Many weapons and platforms are used in both missions. Amphibious assaults on choke points or tactical air strikes on enemy air bases can be employed as a part of the Sea Control mission. Sea

based tactical aircraft are used in Sea Control missions for anti-air warfare and against enemy surface combatants. The distinction in these cases is not in the type of forces nor the tactics which are employed, but in the purpose of the operation. Is the objective to secure/deny use of the seas or is it to directly support the land campaign? For instance, much of the layman's confusion over aircraft carrier use stems from the impression that they are employed exclusively in the Projection of Power Ashore role. Actually, from the Battle of Cape Matapan through World War II, aircraft carriers were used almost exclusively to establish control of the ocean's surface. Today they clearly have a vital role to play in both the Sea Control and Projection of Power missions.

In summary, Projection of Power Ashore tactics are:

PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE

- Amphibious Assault
  - Marine Amphibious Force
  - Marine Amphibious Brigade
  - Marine Amphibious Unit
  - Raid
- Naval Bombardment
  - Direct
  - Indirect
- Tactical Air
  - Deep Interdiction
  - Battlefield Interdiction
  - Close Air Support
  - Counterair/Anti-air

### Naval Presence Mission

Simply stated, the Naval Presence mission is the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives. Presence forces are used for two broad objectives:

- To deter actions inimical to the interests of the U.S. or its allies
- To encourage actions that are in the interests of the U.S. or its allies

We attempt to accomplish these objectives with two tactics: preventive deployments and reactive deployments. The key difference is whether we initiate a show of presence in peacetime (preventive) or whether we are responding to a crisis (reactive). In a preventive deployment our force capabilities should be relevant to the kind of problems which might arise, clearly cannot be markedly inferior to some other naval force in the neighborhood, but can rely to some extent on the implication that reinforcements can be made available if necessary. On the other hand, in a reactive deployment any force deployed needs to possess an immediately credible threat and be prepared to have its bluff called. If another sea power, such as the Soviet Union, is in the area, a comparison of forces will be inevitable.

In deciding to insert a presence force, we must consider what size and composition of force is appropriate to the situation. There are basically five actions with which a Naval Presence force can threaten another nation:

- Amphibious Assault
- Air Attack
- Bombardment
- Blockade
- Exposure through reconnaissance

In addition, almost any size and type of presence force can imply that the United States is concerned with the situation and may decide to bring other military forces to bear.

All too often, especially in reactive deployments, we tend to send the largest and most powerful force that can move to the scene rapidly. The image created may not be appropriate to the specific problem. For instance, the threat of major air attack on a small oil sheikdom would not be credible, but the threat of an amphibious assault on the capital might be; or, sailing a major fleet to show support for a small government threatened with insurrection might be more unsettling than stabilizing, perhaps prompting overaction.

When selecting a Naval Presence force, we must also take into account how the countries that we want to influence will perceive the situation. There are three distinctly different categories of national perceivers:

The Soviet Union: When contemplating a U.S. presence force, the Soviets must assess their comparative naval strength available over time, and the expected degree of U.S. resolve.

Their principal strength comparison would probably be on which country can exercise sea control in the area in question since the United States is not likely to pose a threat of projecting power directly against the USSR, except in a worldwide crisis of the most serious proportions.

Nations Allied to the Soviets: Nations with close ties to the Soviets must assess relative US-USSR capabilities in the particular circumstances. These powers will be asking the question, "Can the United States project its assembled power onto my shores?" and "Can the USSR deny them that capability?" Thus third nation appraisal of relative sea control strengths may be the most critical factor. We should note, however, that third power assessments may not correspond to either U.S. or Soviet assessments of identical military factors.


Unaligned Third Nations: There will be cases where a nation is not able to invoke major power support in a dispute with the United States. The perceptions of such a country would likely focus on U.S. capability and will to project its power ashore to influence events in that country itself.

Thus, the naval presence mission is simultaneously as sophisticated and sensitive as any, but also probably the least understood of all Navy missions. A well orchestrated Naval Presence can be enormously useful in complementing



diplomatic actions to achieve political objectives. Applied deftly but firmly, in precisely the proper force, Naval Presence can be a persuasive deterrent to war. If used ineptly, it can be disastrous. Thus, in determining presence objectives, scaling forces, and appraising perceptions, there will never be a weapons system as important as the human intellect.

In summary, the tactics of the Naval Presence mission are:



#### CURRENT AND FUTURE ISSUES INVOLVING NAVAL MISSIONS AREAS

The United States, as we have seen, has performed the four basic naval missions for many years. Yet the dynamic nature of world conditions demands a continuing reassessment of the relation of one mission to another and the comparative emphasis on their individual tactics. National priorities change. The nature of the threat changes. Only by understanding the complex interdependence between naval missions and their elements can we expect to be able to allocate resources wisely and prepare for the future rather than the past.

Some of the key issues which must be addressed are:

Intra Mission Issues

Strategic Deterrence

- Can we maintain our balance of power image and accent controlled response without appearing to be developing a first strike capability?

Sea Control

- Should future SSN's be designed for employment in barriers (attrition) or as escorts (local engagement)?

Projection of Power Ashore

Amphibious Assault -

- Should we design lift forces and tactics differently for different size assault?

Naval Bombardment -

- Should the vanishing 6 inch and 8 inch guns be replaced? If so, by what?

Tactical Air -

- How much high performance capability is needed (or can we afford) for deep interdiction?
- What tactical application could VSTOL aircraft best fulfill?

Naval Presence

- Are there different operating policies that would yield a greater presence capability?

### Inter Mission Issues

#### Strategic Deterrence vs General Purpose Forces

- Should sea based missiles be favored over the other elements of the TRIAD and assume a greater role in Strategic Deterrence?

#### Sea Control vs Projection of Power

- Does the increased size of the Soviet Navy signal the end of our freedom to project power from sea sanctuaries and justify shifting more resources into Sea Control?
- Are "Lo-mix"\* Sea Control forces incompatible with the Projection of Power?

#### Presence vs Combative Missions

- Is the Presence mission becoming sufficiently important to warrant building or designing forces for that purpose?

#### Force Mix

Some say the Navy should move toward more sophisticated, multi-purpose units. Others advocate cheaper, single mission units, but more of them. What mix of high cost, multi-mission and low cost, less sophisticated forces does the Navy need to carry out the three non-strategic missions?

---

\*When we think in the accustomed terms of projection of power from sea sanctuaries, we incline toward larger, more cost-effective, and more efficient platforms (the "hi" of the "hi-lo mix"). Sea Control favors numbers of units because operations will likely spread to numerous areas; the "Lo" of the mix.

I invite you to be CNO for a few minutes. In the following chart, Figure 5, using

H (high) to mean expensive, sophisticated, multi-mission

L (low) to mean cheap, simple technology, single mission indicate under each mission whether high (H) or low (L) sophistication characteristics need to be built into aircraft, ships, submarines, weapons, and sensors to carry out the specific tactic.

## FORCE MIX

		MISSIONS		SEA CONTROL					PROJECTION OF POWER					PRESENCE	
TACTICS	FORCES														
		SORTIE CONTROL	CHOKE POINT CONTROL	OPEN AREA OPERATIONS	LOCAL ENGAGEMENT	DECEPTION	INTIMIDATION	AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT	NAVAL BOMBARDMENT	DEEP INTERDICTION	BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION	CLOSE AIR SUPPORT	COUNTER AIR /ANTI-AIR	PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT	REACTIVE DEPLOYMENT
AIRCRAFT															
SHIPS															
SUBMARINES															
SENSORS															
WEAPONS															

FIG. 5

Obviously we cannot resolve these issues in a vacuum. We must consider both what our national political objectives are

and what any potential opponent is doing. Our principal military concern, of course, is the growing Soviet Navy. The evolution of their post World War II navy would indicate that they started with a sea denial orientation as evidenced by their emphasis on submarines. There are those who argue that this was intended only to deny us access to waters from which we could Project Power into the Soviet Union. There are others who contend that their sea denial capability now includes being able to interdict our resupply operations over a wide span of oceans. It also seems clear that the Soviet Navy has chosen to exercise its Naval Presence capabilities aggressively. Whether they look on this as a fall-out of their other capabilities or have done so deliberately is difficult to assess. With the advent of Soviet aircraft carriers and the continuing expansion of their amphibious forces, there is a growing question of whether they have ambitions for Projection of Power Ashore capability. If so, it would logically be accompanied by assertive Sea Control capabilities to defend their projection forces. Even smaller non-allied navies, such as the Chinese, must be taken into account. They, as the Soviets, are starting with a sea denial orientation. With relatively simple sea denial weapons such as anti-ship missiles and mines proliferating and extending in reach, the threat of sea denial in restricted waters from even the smallest navies may well increase in the future.

There will always be this constant flow and counter flow of mission emphasis and tactical adaptation. Perhaps it is even more accentuated today than in the past. On the one hand, the pace of technological innovation is forcing this. On the other, the changing nature of world political relationships demands a continual updating of naval capabilities to support national policy. Naval officers, as professionals, must understand the Navy's missions, continually question their rationale, and provide the intellectual basis for keeping them relevant and responsive to the nation's needs. Unless we do, we will be left behind attempting to use yesterday's tools to achieve today's objectives.

*Flag Officer* 722 80  
73024

*Motor Park* 692 2466 *Booker #1*

WASHINGTON

Room

Phone Numbers

RADM Read	BuPers 2711	OX-41291
RADM Staring	ARLEX 2042	OX-45021
VADM Bagley	BuPers 2072	OX-41101
CNO	4E660	OX-56007
RADM Crowe	4E566	OX-54402
LGEN Jaskilka	Rm 2036- AA	OX-48003
LGEN Rogers	Rm 2E736	OX-56003
RADM Train	Rm 4E566	OX-70831
Bob Murray	Rm 3E869	OX-77234
Andy Marshall	Rm 3A930	OX-51822
VADM Ed Hooper	Bldg 220, WNY	433-2210
Chief Carpenter	Rm 4E658	OX 54412
Qtrs P-1		433-2287
Dean Krogh	Office - Foreign Service School Georgetown University	625-2518
	Home - 2 Wynkoop Ct, Bethesda, MD	229-6753

RADM JON L. BOYES,  
NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS

RM 5A718  
(PENTAGON)

OX 57284

M. RICHARD ROSE  
DEP ASS7. SECDEF (EDUCATION)

RM 3D262

OX 70617

WASHINGTON SCHEDULE

17 - 18 APRIL 1974

*Call shipping Co*

Wednesday, 17 April 1974

TAB

1130 - Leave Retreat

*Call Foss*

1230 - Allegheny Flight #892

1340 - Arrive National Airport - met by CNO car  
(At disposal for entire visit)

1400 - Meet RADM Hanson in RADM Read's Office

- - YNCS Duplicate Original of Evaluation  
(President Selection Board - Room G734)

A

1430 - Call on RADM Read

Personnel status

B

1500 - Call on VADM Bagley

Draft letter to Bayne

Wilson, 3 stars

*Student levels - Cagle mms*

C

1530 - Call on LTGEN Samuel Jaskilka, USMC, Rm 2034

Keever letter

D

1630 - Academic Sherry, Dean Krogh's Office  
36th and N Streets

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service  
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

E

1700 - Nash Lecture by Mr. William Bundy

F

List of VADM Turner's personal guests

G

Reception IHO Mr. Bundy following in  
Copley Lounge

2000 - Dinner at Dean Krogh's home  
2 Wynkoop Court, Bethesda, Maryland

H

2100 - Quarters P-1



Call Foss  
Call Shipping Co  
Call Lead  
TAB

Thursday, 18 April 1974

0900 - 2E736

0945 - CNO

Bates Professorship	
Draft letter to VADM Bayne	I
Missions	
Letter to CNO	J
Precis (3)	K
Single Page Precis (6)	L
Letter from USS OWENS	M
Letter from Proceedings	N
<del>Preference List</del>	O
Status of Colbert Dedication	
Herrington: Co-Author book on	
Naval Policy	
CNET Command Relationship	
- - Mr. Robert Murray	P
1100 - Appointment	
Flag List	Q
1200 - RADM Train (Lunch)	
CDR Nepier V. Smith	R
Net Assessment Missions	S
- RADM Crowe	
Draft Letter	T
0900 - General Bernie Rogers @ 2E736	
Jackly Point Paper	U
- - Honorable M. Richard Rose 3D262	V
1440 - Allegheny Flight #945	
1545 - Arrive T. F. Green	
1630 - Arrive NAVWARCOL	


Steve Markis




2 April 1974

Just a short note to tell you how much I appreciated your article on naval missions in the recent issue of the Naval War College Review. For the first time in my career, I feel that I fully understand and relate to the Navy's mission.

Again Admiral, I appreciate your article and offer this constructive idea for possible use in order to enlighten all members of our Navy.

  
R. J. HART  
CDR, USN  
Commanding Officer

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U. S. Navy  
President, Naval War College  
Newport, RI 02840



COMMANDING OFFICER  
U.S.S. ROBERT A. OWENS (DD-827)

2 April 1974

Dear Vice Admiral Turner:

Just a short note to tell you how much I appreciated your article on naval missions in the recent issue of the Naval War College Review. For the first time in my career, I feel that I fully understand and relate to the Navy's mission.

At this time Admiral, I would like to suggest that you consider the feasibility of making your article into a short, not over 30 minutes, slide presentation for use by every command in the USN. I believe that there is a great need for all USN personnel to have the missions of the Navy and their profession in focus. I think the old recruiting slogan, "Join the Navy and see the world", is counterproductive and has given them a distorted view.

Again Admiral, I appreciate your article and offer this constructive idea for possible use in order to enlighten all members of our Navy.

Sincerely,



R. J. HART  
CDR, USN  
Commanding Officer

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U. S. Navy  
President, Naval War College  
Newport, RI 02840

# MISSIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600170004-5

## Strategic Deterrence

- ASSURED SECOND STRIKE
- CONTROLLED RESPONSE
- DETER THIRD POWERS
- BALANCE OF POWER IMAGE

## Sea Control (Assertive Control/Sea Denial)

- SORTIE CONTROL
- CHOKE POINT CONTROL
- OPEN AREA OPERATIONS
- LOCAL ENGAGEMENT
- DECEPTION
- INTIMIDATION

## Projection of Power Ashore

### AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

- MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
- MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE
- MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT
- RAID

### NAVAL BOMBARDMENT

- DIRECT
- INDIRECT

### TACTICAL AIR

- DEEP INTERDICTION
- BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION
- CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
- COUNTERAIR/ANTIAIR

## Naval Presence

- PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENTS
- REACTIVE DEPLOYMENTS

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005 / UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE

ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21402

25 March 1974

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN  
President  
Naval War College  
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Admiral Turner:

Commander Bowler is down in Florida on what he claims is Institute business, but is probably a transparent boondoggle designed to get his old bones away from the cold snap that has been forecast for our part of the country this week.

Before he left, the Board of Control met and considered "The Missions of the Navy." Had he not gone south, I'm sure he would have written you personally to tell you that the Board liked everything about the paper except its length. They asked if you would undertake a revision which would bring it down to between 15 and 20 double-spaced pages of typescript as opposed to its present 23 single-spaced pages.

To their hope that you will do this, may I add my own? We would not like to lose your important message.

May I hear from you at your convenience?

With all good wishes and most respectful regards, I am

Sincerely,

*Clay Barrow*  
Clayton R. Barrow, Jr.  
Editor  
Proceedings













UNCLASSIFIED

NET ASSESSMENT OF  
THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET NAVIES (U)

(U) This assessment is divided into three parts:

- The missions of the United States Navy.
- What we believe to be the missions of the Soviet Navy, with particular attention to recent developments which may portend new missions for the future.
- Comparisons between the two navies, with emphasis on the ability of each to carry out their missions in the face of opposition by the other.

(U) This assessment centers on the General Purpose Naval Forces of both sides--those designed primarily for other than strategic nuclear war. Thus, the Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces of both sides are excluded, save for mention of some inevitable interactions with the opposing Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces.

MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

(U) Aside from the Strategic Nuclear missions, the United States Navy has three generic missions:

- Peacetime Presence: In this role, ships are deployed overseas in peacetime for a variety of objectives, most of which are closely tied to the conduct of our foreign affairs:
  - As evidence of United States commitment on behalf of our allies.
  - As a visible deterrent to potential enemies.
  - As a potential restraining force between belligerents.
  - As a way of protecting or evacuating United States citizens overseas.
- Sea Control: In this role, the Navy:
  - Assures the use of the seas for our own purposes--whether they be commercial, or logistic support, or direct military action--as well as those of our allies, while
  - Denying that capability to our enemies.

UNCLASSIFIED



*Ans On tape*

From: Rear Admiral William J. CROWE, Jr., USN, President,  
Politico-Military/Strategic Planning Subspecialty  
Selection Board

To: Chief of Naval Personnel

Subj: Politico-Military/Strategic Planning Subspecialty  
Selection Board; report of

Ref: (a) CHNAVPERS ltr Pers-474b-rkc-z of 17 Oct 1973

Encl: (1) Report of Politico-Military/Strategic Planning  
Subspecialty Selection Board

1. Pursuant to reference (a), the Politico-Military/Strategic Planning Subspecialty Selection Board convened on 24 October 1973 and adjourned on 6 November 1973. Enclosure (1) is the full report of the Board.


2. In accordance with reference (a), subject Board identified and recommended officers of the unrestricted line for coding as 71XX subspecialists and for designation as "proven subspecialists" in Politico-Military/Strategic Planning. The Board's efforts were the initial step in incorporating this subspecialty into the Operational Technical Managerial System (OTMS).

3. It was also necessary in the selection process for the Board to review and assess the subspecialty concept as it applied to the Politico-Military/Strategic Planning community. As a result of these deliberations, the Board developed a number of views and recommendations which it believed to be of sufficient interest and value to be included in the report.

4. The Board's report is organized under four major headings: background, selection process, remaining problems, and long-term community management. Aside from the actual identification of officers, the Board's most significant action was to recommend additional 71XX codes in order to more accurately describe and inventory the Navy's assets in this area. Perhaps equally important, although in a more philosophical vein, are the Board's views regarding the future development and management of the community. Both of these subjects are elaborated in the report.

5. The substance of the observations, concepts and recommendations included in the report were agreed to by the entire Board. It is the consensus of the Board that its deliberations are a relevant first step in making the Politico-Military/

Strategic Planning community a vigorous segment of OTMS, but that a great deal further experience will be required before the system can be refined and made completely responsive to the Navy's needs. In order to continue its participation in this evolutionary process, the Board agreed to adjourn sine die and to remain in contact in order to address future community issues referred to it by either members of the Board or the Chief of Naval Personnel.

  
WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy



REPORT OF POLITICO-MILITARY/STRATEGIC PLANNING

SUBSPECIALTY SELECTION BOARD  
24 October - 6 November 1973

Ref: (a) CHNAVPERS ltr Ser Pers-474-b-4kc-2 of 17 Oct 1973  
(b) OPNAVINST 1211.6D of 8 Jan 1973  
(c) Officer Personnel Newsletter (Aug 1973 Edition)  
(d) BUPERSNOTE 1040 of 28 Apr 1973

Encl: (1) Background and Rationale for Recommended Politico-Military/Strategic Planning Subspecialty Coding Structure

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Politico-Military/Strategic Planning Subspecialty Selection Board convened on 24 October and adjourned sine die on 6 November 1973. While the Board's major function was to recommend officers for a subspecialty designation in the 71XX series, it was necessary in the process for the Board to examine and make a number of decisions concerning the subspecialty concept as it applied to the politico-military and strategic planning community. In turn, the Board developed a number of recommendations and views regarding the community and its future management which it felt deserved further consideration. The following is a report of the Board's deliberations which is organized under four major headings: background, selection process, remaining problems, and long-term community management.

BACKGROUND

2. Board Composition. The Board was composed of eleven highly qualified officers with extensive and varied experience in the politico-military/strategic planning area. The following is a listing of those officers along with their current assignments:

RADM William J. CROWE, Jr.	CNO (Op-60B)
CAPT Jimmie B. ALLRED	CNO (Op-60C)
CAPT Jack HILTON	JCS (J5)
CAPT Wayne P. HUGHES, Jr.	CNO (Op-96B)
CAPT Carl J. LIDEL	JNT STRATAR PLNS STF
CAPT James H. LYTLE	CNO (Op-06)
CAPT William R. MARTIN	OSD (ISA)
CAPT William A. PLATTE	JCS (J5)
CAPT Curtis B. SHELLMAN, Jr.	CNO (Op-604C)
CAPT Herbert W. SMEVOG	NAVWARCOL (Tactics Faculty)
CAPT Edmund T. WOOLDRIDGE, Jr.	NATWARCOL (Strategic Research Group)

3. Guidelines. The Board conducted its proceedings within the following guidelines established by reference (a):

a. Identify and recommend officers of the unrestricted line for designation as a "Proven Subspecialist" in Politico-Military/Strategic Planning. To enable the Chief of Naval Personnel to most effectively manage the Politico-Military/Strategic Planning officer community, and to provide recognition for superior officers in this field, the Board is to select those officers who have demonstrated excellence in the performance of Politico-Military/Strategic Planning assignments. Overall naval performance and background are important and should be considered. However, proven superior performance as a Politico-Military/Strategic Planner, recent related and relevant experience, technical expertise and leadership potential to meet the most demanding Politico-Military/Strategic Planning requirements of the Navy are of overriding importance. The selections must be limited to those officers whose performance records set them apart as quality Politico-Military/Strategic Planners.

b. Assist in community purification. Data base errors may exist in this community. It is important to effective personnel management that such errors be identified and corrected. They fall into four general classes:

(1) Officers with appropriate education who are not correctly P-coded.

(2) P-coded officers whose records do not substantiate the code.

(3) S-coded officers whose experience is obsolete or is insufficient by either quality or quantity to warrant continued identification as a Politico-Military/Strategic Planning Subspecialist.

(4) Officers with recent experience in Politico-Military/Strategic Planning who may warrant identification as a subspecialist but who are not so coded.

The Board should identify any such data base errors and recommend corrective action in its report.

#### SELECTION PROCESS

4. General. In addressing the general task of "purifying" the politico-military/strategic planning subspecialty, the Board was of the unanimous opinion that there had been considerable confusion within the Navy as to the nature or

scope of the community. On one hand, there was a group of officers with 71XX (politico-military) P or S codes as set forth in reference (b). On the other hand, this coding system had been more or less shunted aside by the CARS/CARSO (Country and Regional Specialist/Country and Regional Staff Officer) programs which were initiated in 1971. Many considered this to be the actual politico-military community. However, the terms, CARS/CARSO, were rather ambiguously defined; the relationship between the two was often misconstrued; and these designators were not directly connected with OTMS or the 71XX codes. (The CARS/CARSO programs and their resulting problems will be elaborated in a succeeding section. Also see Enclosure (1) for further background on the two programs.) Likewise, the Board was in agreement that the term politico-military, which was commonly used in referring to both 71XX and CARS/CARSO codes, was not broad enough or sufficiently descriptive in itself to encompass the policy planning community and had been partially responsible for the confusion.

Part of the difficulty was eliminated by the Board's guidance which had expanded the title of the subspecialty to "Politico-Military/Strategic Planning" and directed that the Board's selections for the 71XX codes would replace the CARSO designator, which would then disappear (see reference (d)). These steps did not, however, expand the coding system of reference (b) or relieve the entire problem. Hence, the Board strongly believed that its initial effort should be to structure the community in a manner that would eliminate (or at least take a first step toward eliminating) the current disarray.

5. New Codes. It was the consensus of the Board that the 71XX codes contained in reference (b) were not adequate, and that additional codes were required to accurately define and identify the entire Politico-Military/Strategic Planning community.

First, "Politico-Military" was retained as a specific category with separate designators for each of the traditional subcategories.

Second, the Board believed while there is some commonality between politico-military planning and strategic planning, there are still sufficient differences between the two--in terms of subject matter, work techniques and the Navy's organizational employment of planners--to justify separating the two skills and assigning them separate codes. Further and detailed

definition was required in order to establish the new categories and to distinguish them from the traditional politico-military area. Consequently, the Board in its collective judgment arrived at two distinct types of strategic planners:

- a. The general "Strategic Planner" and
- b. The "Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare)."

The latter category was further broken down into the sub-categories of "Nuclear Warfare Policy Plans" and "Nuclear Warfare Operational Plans."

In recognition of the fact that some senior officers have expertise and experience in both the politico-military and strategic areas, an additional subspecialty code was considered necessary to identify these highly skilled officers. The Board defined these individuals as "Politico-Military/Strategic Planners" and has recommended a subspecialty code of 7100 for them.

One more change was included. There is a large group of officers with postgraduate training in international relations, foreign affairs, political science and related fields who have not had subsequent practical experience in any of the 71XX areas. While many of these officers were designated CARSO on the basis of their educational experience alone, the Board believed strongly that a special category should be established for these officers to reflect more accurately the individual's qualifications and the Navy's assets.

The restructuring of the codes was one of the most important steps taken by the Board. Enclosure (1) discusses at some length the historical background and the Board's detailed rationale in proposing these changes. The following table displays the complete list of recommended codes and titles:

Politico-Military/Strategic Planning Subspecialty Codes

7XXX Series	Social Sciences
71XX Series	<u>Politico-Military/Strategic Planning</u>
7100	Politico-Military/Strategic Planner
Politico-Military	
7110	Political-Military Planner
*7111	Political-Military Planner (Middle East, Africa, or South Asia)

*7112	Political-Military Planner (Far East or Pacific)
*7113	Political-Military Planner (Western Hemisphere)
*7114	Political-Military Planner (Europe)
**7115	Political-Military Planner (General, International Organization Negotiations)

Strategic

7120	Strategic Planner
7130	Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare)
7131	Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare Policy Plans)
7132	Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare Operational Plans)

Graduate Education

7160	Politico-Military Postgraduate
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*7111-7114	Subspecialty area qualifications include familiarity with the operations and policies of, and U.S. participation in, regional defense alliance organizations in the area (e.g., Europe NATO; Pacific and Far East - SEATO).
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**7115	International organizations and negotiation are those of global scope (e.g., the United Nations, Law of the Sea Conference) not including regional organizations and bilateral negotiations.
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The following are the code definitions proposed by the Board:

7100 - Politico-Military/Strategic Planner

Possesses broad politico-military/strategic planning experience, and has demonstrated

superior performance in billets encompassing a wide spectrum of both politico-military and strategic planning responsibilities. Develops, or contributes to the development of, U.S. national objectives, broad conceptual policies, plans and military strategies.

7110 - Politico-Military Planner

Contributes to the development of U.S. national objectives toward other nations, regions and regional organizations, in concert with other departments and agencies of the government. Develops political rationale for use in formulating broad conceptual policies and strategies in pursuit of U.S. national objectives. Evaluates political ramifications and consequences of military decisions, pointing out political advantages or disadvantages of various courses of action. Evaluates political events and attitudes of other nations for their effect on existing and planned U.S. national policies and military strategies.

The politico-military planner is represented by five subspecialty areas, four reflecting expertise in major geographic regions and one recognizing expertise in international negotiations and/or organizations. The last subspecialty area also includes officers who have competence in the general politico-military field, but not as a regional specialist.

7120 - Strategic Planner

Develops broad conceptual military plans and strategy in support of national policy and structures military force requirements to achieve these objectives in the context of assessed and projected threats. Defines specific strategies and courses of action to support policy objectives through optimum use of available assets under selected contingency conditions; or strategic options for use of these assets for crisis management.

7130 - Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare)

Develops broad policies, doctrines and plans for the conduct of strategic and regional

nuclear warfare, subdivided into subspecialty areas as follows;

7131 - Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare Policy Plans)

Develops broad policies and doctrine for the conduct of strategic and regional nuclear warfare; formulates policy guidance for the selection of nuclear attack options; formulates broad policy objectives for nuclear systems acquisition and their deployment; and participates in international negotiations concerning nuclear weapons constraints, and in the development of policy declarations related to nuclear warfare strategy.

7132 - Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare Operational Plans)

Develops plans involving the conduct of strategic and regional nuclear war and assists in the formulation of broad policy and concepts regarding nuclear warfare. Participates in the development of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, supporting plans and/or regional nuclear warfare plans. Alternatively, serves in positions having as a primary responsibility the function of providing, to responsible authorities, advice and assistance on the details of such plans, the military considerations affecting execution of such plans, and assessment of the adequacy of nuclear forces.

7160 - Politico-Military Postgraduate

Identifies those officers who possess a graduate degree in International Relations, Foreign Affairs or Political Science\* awarded by an accredited college or university, but have not acquired further qualifying experience.

\*Other graduate degrees may qualify depending on course content.

It should be stressed that the Board attempted to structure the codes so that they could be directly related to identifiable officer billets on Navy and joint staffs and within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the objective here is to indicate the primary area of the individual's expertise, but there is no intention to confine the officer's duty to that particular area. There are sufficient common elements in politico-military and strategic planning assignments to permit cross-detailing when required for either reasons of availability of career development.

One note of caution is in order. While the Board believes that this first step toward developing additional codes is one in the right direction, it fully appreciates that only experience can validate or disaffirm the value of the new designators and whether the total community has, in fact, been adequately defined. Hopefully, subsequent Boards, profiting from further experience, can refine and tune the system as necessary to make it completely responsive to the Navy's requirements.

6. Selection Criteria. Although the detailed selection process will not be elaborated, some discussion of the working criteria utilized by the Board is considered appropriate, and may be of use to future Boards. These criteria were based on the guidelines in paragraph 3 above.

a. The following thumb rules were utilized for placing the records of unrestricted line Lieutenant Commanders, Commanders and Captains before the Board:

- (1) Applicants or nominations from detailers.
- (2) CARSOs previously selected by the October 1971 selection board.
- (3) Previously coded 7LXX's.
- (4) Education: Master's degree or higher in international law, foreign affairs, political science or government.
- (5) NOBC in strategic planning (9086), international affairs (9942), joint strategic plans and policy (9990) and staff nuclear weapons (9080).
- (6) Assignment(s), past or present, related to the politico-military and/or the strategic planning area.



Based on the above criteria, the records of 1966 officers were considered by the Board.

b. Consistently good performance was a general and pervasive criterion indicating that an officer had both the potential for increased responsibility and future promotions. In order to build a vigorous community, high performance was considered essential for the assignment of any code.

c. Aside from 6b above, the most influential criterion for designation as a subspecialist was experience in politico-military/strategic planning billets. A recent, lengthy and successful tour in this area was essential for designation as a "proven subspecialist." No officer was given credit for a completed or partial tour unless there were reports of his performance during that tour in his record. War College staff, MAAG or military sales experience was weighed carefully but in and of itself was not normally considered sufficient to justify a proven subspecialist code. These billets carried considerable weight when combined with other qualifying experience, such as graduate education. A particularly knotty problem were officers assigned to "wargaming" billets. Generally, strategic and politico-military wargamers were selected into the community if their experience was relevant and they met other required criteria. A number of logistics specialists, with lengthy and valuable tours on Unified Commander staffs or in OJCS (J4), have accrued what appeared to be important planning experience. But they usually were not selected as proven subspecialists or coded in any of the established areas since it was the prevailing opinion of the Board that they more logically fell into other subspecialty areas.

d. Although advanced education was considered an important complement to practical experience, this accomplishment by itself did not qualify officers for any code other than 7160. Education was used to settle close questions as to whether an officer's practical experience was sufficient to qualify him for a code and in these instances solid educational background would normally result in the officer being selected for a substantive code.

e. Taking the above criteria into account, requirements for selection as a proven subspecialist varied with seniority of the officers considered by the Board. This practice was primarily dictated by the fact that officers are not normally ordered into billets within this subspecialty area until they attain LCDR, CDR, or even CAPT ranks. The following combined criteria were generally applied by the Board for selection of proven subspecialists at different ranks:

(1) Captains: At least one recently completed tour, or tour in progress, of about two years; postgraduate education desirable, although this was counterbalanced in some cases by the significance of tour(s); high performance and promotion potential.

(2) Commanders: One recently completed tour, or tour in progress, of about 1 1/2 or 2 years; or graduate education plus a tour of about one year; high performance and promotion potential.

(3) Lieutenant Commanders: One completed tour, or tour in progress, of about one year or more; or successful tour in progress with graduate education; high performance and promotion potential.

f. The heavy stress on promotion potential caused the Board to take an especially critical and careful look at very senior Captains and to select only those with exceptional credentials. Year group '45 and above were considered in this category.

g. Many officers had experience that qualified them for more than one code. In those cases, the Board attempted to determine the most applicable category and coded the officer accordingly. Officers with extensive qualifying experience in both politico-military planning and strategic planning were assigned a 7100 code. In this regard it is appropriate to emphasize that the codes by no means suggest that an officer cannot be detailed in other 71XX areas. A detailer should always consider the entire scope of an officer's experience and not merely his current code.

7. Selection Results. Out of some 1966 records the Board selected 286 proven subspecialists. The following is a breakdown by rank:

	<u>PROVEN</u>	<u>SUBSPECIALIST</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CAPT	152	471	623
CDR	101	419	520
LCDR	33	179	212
TOTAL	286	1069	1355

REMAINING PROBLEM AREAS

8. In the course of its deliberations, the Board noted a number of problem areas which deserve special mention and, in turn, wishes to offer its recommendations.

9. Fitness Reports. All selection boards by definition are forced to rely on officer jackets, but a subspecialty board, which is looking for a particular type of expertise, requires a great deal more than performance ratings and general remarks. Poorly documented fitness reports seriously complicated the selection process. Many of the fitness reports reviewed by the Board contained glowing descriptions of an officer's ability to do a job well without ever describing what the officer actually did. At a minimum, fitness reports should indicate the level at which the work was accomplished, i.e., division head, action officer, etc., and the level at which the work was utilized, i.e., CJCS, CNO/VCNO/DCNO, Fleet Commander, Type Commander, etc. Furthermore, it should relate specific accomplishments in terms of subject matter, what knowledge was required, coordination problems, particular talents displayed, etc. In many cases, personal knowledge by one or more of the Board members was utilized to determine the actual accomplishments of some officers and in some instances extracurricular research was required. Since the Board was relying so heavily on qualifying experience, this deficiency cannot be overemphasized. BUPERS should reemphasize to the officer community, the necessity for providing the above information if an officer is to be given a fair opportunity to acquire a 71XX code.

10. Wargaming Experience. Illustrative of the above is the particular problem of wargaming experience. In practically every instance, it was difficult to determine from fitness reports whether officers involved fulltime in gaming had specifically engaged in the politico-military or strategic planning type of work. Certain wargaming billets unquestionably build this expertise and could be an excellent source of candidates for the 71XX community. Since wargaming duties are focussed in a relatively few offices, appropriate liaison with these agencies is recommended both to make known the need for more elaborate descriptions of the individual's duties and to become better acquainted with those aspects of wargaming which are pertinent to 71XX subspecialist code.

11. CARS/CARSO. Paragraph 4 above spoke to the confusion created by the CARS/CARSO programs. Enclosure (1) elaborates on the origins of and problems associated with these two programs. The new 71XX subspecialty structure has completely replaced the CARSO program and it is now important that those officers who held CARS/CARSO designators recognize this fact. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the CARS program continues unchanged. Furthermore, a number of previously designated CARSO officers failed to meet the Board's criteria for coding as a Politico-Military/Strategic

Planner and may no longer hold a subspecialty code in this area or may have reverted to a 7160 code. The Board recommends that the Chief of Naval Personnel undertake to publish an explanatory statement in this regard.

12. Seniority of Community. As indicated by the Board's results, the Politico-Military/Strategic Planning community is heavily weighted with senior officers. This was predictable, but its effects still should be a cause for some concern. In many instances, we now have important Captain billets being filled by officers with no prior tours in the field. Just as disturbing, once many of these officers obtain the requisite experience, they are often on the verge of retiring and the Navy receives too little return on its investment. In order to improve the overall health of the community and to achieve a better rank balance, a genuine effort should be made not only to funnel officers into the graduate education process as early as possible, but also to identify a larger number of Lieutenant and Lieutenant Commander billets in the area.

There probably will be sine curve peaks and valleys in the community as a whole, and particularly in the "proven" category, as the more senior officers attrit and upcoming candidates remain unidentifiable, computerwise, due to the biennial nature of the politico-military/strategic planning selection board. This may not be a problem, provided the community is large enough, which, based on the results of this selection board, it appears to be. Nevertheless, some system should be developed for temporarily coding officers (as subspecialists but not as provens) who complete a successful high performance qualifying tour. This decision can then be reviewed and affirmed or disaffirmed when the next subspecialty selection board meets.

13. Government Sponsored Education. It appears that there has been too little thought given to utilization tours for officers with government-sponsored postgraduate education. Many, because of their outstanding performance, appear to have been selected for other assignments by BUPERS, in spite of their educational background, and never have been employed in the field or used too little. This is not only wasteful and poor management practice, but invites Congressional criticism of the entire program. In the future, it is recommended that heavy weight be given to an officer's postgraduate education when assignments are made.

14. Non-Government Sponsored Education. Confusing the educational picture is the large number of political science/international relations degree holders who obtained their graduate training on their own time. The bulk of these degrees were earned while attending Service colleges and participating in an extracurricular program offered by a civilian university. What should be the relationship between these officers and the political-military/strategic planning community?

First, the Board is aware that there is some pressure on the Navy to reduce or even eliminate its in-house postgraduate program because of this large number of officers. It is the opinion of the Board that under no circumstances should the Navy voluntarily eliminate its postgraduate training program. The Board's view of postgraduate education will be elaborated in a subsequent section (see paragraph 20). This program is even more important now since it appears that those civilian programs associated with the war colleges are going to be discontinued and in a few years the excess of graduate degree holders will disappear.

Second, this group is a definite asset to the politico-military/strategic planning community. These officers act as a supplement to the Navy-sponsored postgraduate program and should be utilized to the maximum possible extent. Many of these officers have performed extremely well in the academic world and the very fact that they have gone to the effort to obtain outside education attests to their motivation. Unfortunately, the mathematics of the billet structure prevents all these individuals being assigned within the politico-military/strategic planning community, even if they meet the performance criteria.

15. Education and Practical Experience. The Board fully appreciates the value of graduate education and believes that a strong politico-military/strategic planning community must rest on a solid educational foundation. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the Board believed strongly that any formal subspecialty qualification should rest primarily on practical experience.

The differences between working in the academic world and the actual Navy planning arena are considerable. Success in one does not necessarily connote success in the other. Only practical experience in the "pressure cooker" can tell us what we need to know in coding 71XX subspecialists. Consequently,

it must be appreciated that education by itself is not an adequate criterion for 71XX subspecialist selection. The Board believes that this point is not properly recognized and recommends that this reasoning be given proper publicity and dissemination throughout the Navy.

16. Billet Designation. Reference (b) recommends criteria for assigning subspecialty codes to billets. If 71XX subspecialty codes are not assigned on the basis of education, then assignment of subspecialty code alpha digits for billet codes that relate to educational qualifications is questionable, at least for the politico-military/strategic planning community. Additionally, the rationale for alpha digits contained in reference (b) may have erroneously conveyed to some officers the impression that advanced education is a mandatory requirement for designation as a "proven subspecialist" and assignment to a key and/or desirable politico-military/strategic planning billet. The Board recommends that the method of designating billets be changed. Specific recommendations are made in paragraph 21 below.

17. Detailing. The Board in reviewing several hundred records, could not fail to question the manner in which some officers were detailed. At critical points in the careers of many officers with politico-military/strategic planning expertise, they were drawn off for other assignments which had little or nothing to do with their subspecialty and never returned to the field. This may have stemmed from lack of appreciation for the expertise required in key assignments, lack of reliable billet identification, the individual officer's desire to diversify, and/or lack of interest in the community by the sponsor and BUPERS. Whatever the root causes, the results have not been good. Many of the most senior and important billets in the community are filled by officers with no previous experience in the field while officers with considerable background and talent are in other areas. Simultaneously, this haphazard approach has made it difficult to establish realistic career and community development goals and, in turn, the general health of the community has suffered. The Board does not contend that once an officer enters the community that he should not be detailed to any other type of billet. The Board does believe that under the subspecialty concept this community should have first call on those officers with the requisite experience and education, and that one of the primary goals of the detailing process should be to maintain the overall quality of the community at a high level, and to fill important billets with subspecialty qualified officers.

LONG-RANGE COMMUNITY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

18. General. As the Board wended its way through the selection process and discussed the many associated problems, it became clear that there is a pressing need for a management structure which looks at the community's needs as a whole. Goals, planning, training, billet identification, detailing and career development are related parts, and if the politico-military/strategic planning community is to efficiently meet the Navy's and the individual's needs, all of these elements must be dealt with in an integrated manner. BUPERS cannot do this alone. It is essential that some office or individual with current knowledge of the substantive needs and problems of the community be brought directly into the picture in some fashion. Because of the importance of this concept, the last section of the report has been devoted to the Board's view of long-range community planning and management.

19. Community Sponsor. It is the unanimous opinion of the Board that the Community Sponsor is best fitted and located to assist BUPERS and that he should be given a stronger role in the personnel management of his community. The following paragraphs will discuss specific ways in which the community sponsor can participate and contribute to correcting some of the problems pointed out earlier.

20. Postgraduate Education. Although the Board was insistent that qualification as a subspecialist must rest on actual experience in the field and demonstrated performance, it was still the unanimous opinion of the Board that postgraduate education is the single best source of potential politico-military/strategic planners. This is not to say that all officers in the community should have advanced education or that it is the only way to obtain expertise. It is to say that postgraduate training achieves several valuable objectives:

a. All curricula in this field lay particular stress on writing and reasoning skills.

b. Certain civilian academic curricula furnish the factual knowledge directly applicable to the politico-military area and are excellent preparation for politico-military planners.

c. It is practically the only way to provide an officer (who has not been raised overseas) with in-depth knowledge of a geographical area, country or language in a reasonable length of time.



d. It acquaints the individual officer with the various lines of theoretical thinking in the field, the prominent personalities in his area of expertise, and the language and techniques used by professionals.

e. It teaches the officer how to operate in the scholastic environment and to draw on academe's resources to assist the Navy and himself.

f. It generally broadens his perspectives intellectually and professionally irrespective of his specific field of study.

g. On occasion, the Navy can very profitably use the prestige which goes with an advanced degree to gain access to civilian councils and nowhere is this more true than in the politico-military/strategic planning area.

One other facet should be mentioned. The military is held in low regard by a large sector of the academic community. Often the genesis of this feeling is more emotional than rational, but the fact remains that this prejudice is widespread and not easily dispelled. The best way to modify this academic bias is to send outstanding officers to civilian institutions and let them demonstrate through the everyday processes of living and going to school with our detractors that they are wrong in their narrow view of military officers. Those faculties and schools where the Navy has had postgraduate students over a period of years almost without exception have come to appreciate and admire career naval officers and, in turn, do not exhibit the paranoia about professional military that characterizes so many universities. This side effect of the postgraduate program should not be overlooked; particularly in this day and age when the Navy desperately needs to establish a close partnership with the academic world.

In summary, the Board argues for as strong and diversified postgraduate program as the Navy can fashion and support. This need is highlighted by cancellation of the War College concurrent masters degree program, which will result in a sharp drop in potential 71XX code candidates--particularly at the junior levels.

In order to derive the maximum benefit from the postgraduate program, the Board believes that it should be tightly monitored and controlled by the community sponsor. He should have a strong voice in determining the numbers (if there is any latitude), the selection of candidates, the schools



utilized, and the individual student's area of emphasis (i.e., the curricula). The purpose here is to insure that:

-- The community is furnished with a constant, adequate, and high quality supply of graduate students.

-- The training of these officers supports the Navy's substantive needs, e.g., in the politico-military area there should be adequate numbers of officers trained in the affairs of each of the major geographical areas--Latin America, Europe, Soviet Union, Middle and Near East, Africa, South East Asia, and the Far East.

-- Within fiscal limits, the postgraduate students are spread over as many as possible of the influential centers of learning in order to always have officers familiar with the different academic approaches to politico-military/strategic planning and conversely to have Navy access to the faculties of these schools.

Before leaving the subject of postgraduate education, some particular problems should be briefly discussed.

The "strategic planner" category established by the Board is only indirectly related to the curricula of the postgraduate schools presently employed by the Navy. Unlike the politico-military area where the emphasis is on foreign affairs, the stress in the strategic area is often on the domestic bureaucracy--its inner workings, the relationships between major branches, U.S. goals and values, the program and budgeting process, etc. There are a few civilian universities which can structure a course appropriate to this need if encouraged but do not now do so. In a different vein, it might be possible to build a one-year PG course at Monterey which is directly applicable to this field and which could use classified materials in the instruction process. (This proposal was actually made a few years ago by the Superintendent of the Postgraduate School.) In any event, since the number of strategic planning billets considerably outnumber the politico-military billets, the Board strongly recommends that BUPERS, in conjunction with the community sponsor, study the possibility of instituting a postgraduate course specifically designed to prepare officers as strategic planners.

Lastly, politico-military/strategic planners, as envisioned in the subspecialty concept, are not necessarily "area specialists" in the academic or expert sense. The Army has attempted to produce such people under its FAST program and, of course, our own CARS program was a gesture in this direction.

To achieve the level of training and experience necessary to qualify an individual as a genuine authority on a particular geographical area requires a "lifetime" devoted to the study of that area. The Board detects some ambivalence within the Navy in this regard. When a particular region or area receives unusual attention, there is always some demand to find officers who have the needed background, language competence, etc. The Board believes that the Navy should clearly distinguish what it is possible to achieve and not achieve in this regard. The postgraduate program can give you individuals with sufficient knowledge of an area to work as a planner, to recognize true expertise, to work with academicians, to supervise area specialists and to relate the work of area specialists to the Navy's problems. But, if the Navy wants the services of a bona fide specialist it should go to the State Department, academic world, or civilian contractor and make special arrangements. It is not possible to produce these people within the Navy's officer structure and postgraduate program. Certainly the CARS program, except in some extremely rare exceptions, does not give you this kind of expertise. If we do desire naval officers who at the same time are genuine "area specialists" then some unique training program and assignment pattern would have to be designed and these officers administered outside of the normal line officer structure.

Clearly, not all politico-military/strategic subspecialists will have the opportunity to attend postgraduate school. Consequently, other training sources should also be examined and strengthened. One possibility is to structure a special Naval War College curriculum to support the politico-military/strategic planning community and to partially fill the void created by cancellation of the concurrent masters degree program. As with the postgraduate training, this program should be rigidly controlled by BUPERS and the community sponsor to limit the number of participants to community requirements and to insure that the curriculum was current and relevant. Again the Board recommends that this possibility be examined.

Another device with promise is the establishment of a larger number of grooming (preparation) billets in order to train personnel at the lieutenant or below level in the politico-military/strategic planning area. These billets would be taken from those identified by the community sponsor during his billet review as training billets and/or billets not requiring subspecialists. This suggestion will no doubt be hindered by the current cut back, but again the Board believes strongly that there is a need for an input of younger officers into the community.

21. Billet Designations. Billets for the politico-military/strategic planning community must bear some relationship to the realities of both supply and demand. The requirements for "proven subspecialists" must be drawn up with an appreciation for the time and experience which such a designator represents and maintained at a reasonable level. The quality of the community can be cheapened rapidly if unrealistically large requirements for proven subspecialists are generated by billet reviews. On the other hand, if proven subspecialist billet requirements are too small, the community will become identified as an unduly restrictive "closed club." These same comments apply not only to provens but to the community as a whole on a lesser plane. Billet reviews must provide a proper balance to make selection into the community a desirable and attainable objective for the ambitious officer. To achieve this, the community sponsor is in the best position to look at the billet structure of the community as a whole and should have the responsibility for conducting the billet review and authority to make final decisions. As a minimum, the sponsor should conduct a billet review six months prior to each selection board to ensure that realistic requirements are known to the board.

Reference (b) specifies that subspecialty billets not only be assigned an appropriate four numeric designator, but in addition an alpha-digit as mentioned in paragraph 16 above. The alpha-digits, with the exception of the S and T qualifiers, all relate to educational background. For reasons discussed above, the Board believes that educational background is not the critical indicator in selecting qualified politico-military/strategic subspecialists and, in turn, billet coding should be related to the selection process. The Board recommends instead the following alpha-digits:

-C - Code -- assigned to billets where the talents of a proven subspecialist are required.

V - Code -- assigned to billets where significant level of experience and/or training is required and where it would be desirable but not mandatory to have a proven subspecialist.

T - Code -- assigned to billets not requiring previous experience in the field.

These alpha codes provide a rough measure of the qualifications desired in billet assignments and accord with the qualification codes.

The Board understands that assigning an education code to a billet assists in rationalizing and justifying the Navy's postgraduate program. However, this does not accord with real-life practice. Not only is an officer's value better measured by experience in the field, but as a practical matter, degree holders are not always assigned to the P-coded billets and non-degree holders to the S-coded billets. Moreover, an organization which has an officer with a PhD or Masters uses his knowledge, expertise, and academic credentials where they are needed and he may be assigned a number of tasks outside of his specific billet description. Likewise, rank does not necessarily correlate with the need for advanced education.

A more realistic way to express the need for officers with graduate education, is to relate the requirement to an office or to an area rather than to specific billets or rank, e.g., the Far East Policy section of a staff requires four officers with graduate degrees, and at least one with a PhD, etc. In a similar fashion, the overall need for officers with advanced training could be linked to the number of proven billets in the total structure, e.g., the Navy should strive to have as many officers with graduate degrees as there are C-coded billets, this would roughly assure that one-third of that number would be serving in subspecialty billets at any one time. These suggestions are merely illustrative and the subject would require some research before arriving at a final formula.

If it is absolutely necessary to tie billets to degrees for administrative purposes, the Board would recommend that billets for this community be coded using the four numeric digits and some alpha digit only in those billets requiring proven subspecialists. All other billets could be coded with four numeric digits. The use of other educational alpha digits contained in reference (b) for coding this community is definitely not recommended.

22. Detailing. In order to close the circle, the community sponsor should also participate in the detailing process. He should not necessarily have a veto, but a strong voice with respect to billet assignments requiring subspecialists. Of primary importance are the Navy's interests. Not only must billets be filled by competent and appropriate officers, but the talent must be distributed in an equitable and rational manner. In a subspecialist community this involves more than numbers, rank, and availability. Officers with graduate training must be utilized properly. Certain types

of knowledge, experience and expertise are more appropriate for some billets than others, and quality must be parceled out evenly as well as numbers.

Just as prominent in the community sponsor's thinking must be training. Throughout this report, the Board has stressed that the subspecialty qualifications must primarily rest on experience. It therefore follows that considerable thought must go into the career development of individual officers. The community sponsor must insure that an adequate number of officers receive the qualifying experience to become proven subspecialists and that they do this in time to be profitably utilized. Just as with postgraduate education, there will be a requirement for officers with particular knowledge and experience in varying subjects or duties. The community sponsor will be more sensitive to such requirements than a detailer and cannot insure that these demands will be met without some role in the detailing process.

Lastly, the individual himself should profit from the community sponsor's guiding hand. For career satisfaction, the subspecialists's skill and knowledge should be built up in a consistent and logical fashion and his assignments should be related to his training. Similarly, when the needs of the Navy make unusual demands on the subspecialist, he should have a "friend in court" who can speak in his behalf in the BUPERS forum. For instance, individuals with special talent are often required to do extended tours in their subspecialty area and then are discriminated against or shunted aside when returning to sea duty. Conversely, officers in planning billets outside of the Navy are sometimes extended by their superiors without due consideration of the career imperatives of the Navy. The community sponsor should at least insure that the officer's superior understands the problem and use his influence to keep the officer in a viable career pattern.

The point is that an office which is familiar with and sensitive to the substantive demands of the politico-military/strategic planning community must participate in and supplement the Navy's normal personnel procedures if the 71XX community is to successfully fit into OTMS. This type of sponsor participation is considered to be mandatory and essential for proper control of the community and to promote the Navy's interests and the officer's career development.

POSTSCRIPT

23. The substance of the above observations, concepts and recommendations were agreed to by the entire Board. The Board fully appreciates that some of its thoughts are radical by today's standards and that experience may suggest different solutions. The Board strongly believes that its deliberations are an appropriate first step and that with some effort and nourishment the Politico-Military/Strategic Planning community can be made a vigorous part of OTMS.

In order to continue its participation in the refining process, the Board agreed to adjourn sine die, to remain in contact, and to address future community problems when referred to it by members of the Board or the Bureau of Personnel.

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDED  
POLITICO-MILITARY/STRATEGIC PLANNING  
SUBSPECIALTY CODING STRUCTURE

1. Historical Background. Historically, the term "politico-military planner" has been used to describe individuals engaged in any type of policy planning billet and under the old NOBC coding system a block of numbers was used to code officers with politico-military expertise. In 1971, at the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, an extensive examination of the "subspecialization" concept was initiated and it was clearly recognized that nowhere was the approach to specialization more important than in the area of politico-military planning. From this study evolved the Country, Area, Regional Staff Officer (CARSO) program, instituted concurrently with the Country, Area, Regional Specialist (CARS) program. The fundamental goal was to develop and identify small communities of officers with in-depth knowledge of various countries, areas, or regions of the world. Both programs were approved by the CNO in 1971 and defined as follows:

CARS: A Country, Area, or Regional Specialist is an officer of any designator who has been formally identified as having considerable expertise in a specific country, area or region by virtue of language qualification, academic background and practical experience.

CARSO: A Country, Area or Regional Staff Officer of any designator who has been selected by a CARSO selection board as qualified to serve on a major staff in a Politico-Military or Strategic Planning billet requiring the specific country, area, or regional expertise.

In consonance with the regions of specialization utilized on Navy Staffs (and within the State Department), four general sub-categories were established to assist in identifying the individual officer's area of expertise:

- I. Middle East, Africa, South Asia
- II. Pacific, Far East (excluding USSR)
- III. Western Hemisphere
- IV. Europe, NATO (including USSR)

ENCLOSURE (1)

The CARS/CARSO communities were not intended to compete with the Foreign Service, but to encourage officers to obtain the necessary country, area, or regional expertise to meet the Navy's needs for politico-military planners and for dealing with foreign military officers and diplomats.

The Navy has historically had an extensive interest in the field of International Affairs and by the very nature of its peacetime and wartime missions, must maintain close contact with other maritime countries of the world. In turn, the CNO wished to develop some rational and organized system for facilitating such contact and for identifying officers who had:

- expertise in foreign languages,
- considerable education in foreign affairs, international relations, area studies or related field of political science,
- practical experience gained by serving in or with foreign military establishments or in key regional billets on major staffs,
- significant combinations of the above qualifications.

Officers with this type of background have been developed and utilized for many years on a less formal basis with little specific management control or direction. Some officers interested in the politico-military areas sought education and assignments that developed the requisite talents. These talents were utilized to varying degrees by the Navy. It was not uncommon, however, to overlook quality officers with special expertise, and there was no assurance that the required number of officers with the necessary level of expertise would be available when needed. This was especially true when rapidly expanding requirements for knowledge of specific countries, areas, or regions could not be identified well in advance of the need. These types of requirements will not decrease and if anything can be expected to increase. In essence, it is necessary to insure that some of those officers who become specialized in politico-military affairs, strategic planning, political science and foreign relations become genuine politico-military subspecialists.



As a follow-on to the CNO decision, a CARS/CARSO Selection Board was convened to identify and designate qualified officers as CARS and CARSOs. The Board considered records of all applicants and any other records deemed appropriate by the Bureau of Personnel. The primary factors considered for selection were competency in languages, practical experience in foreign countries (including heritage), formal education in the foreign affairs-international relations areas, politico-military planning experience, performance in operational specialty, and potential for utilization. The weight of consideration given each factor varied with different ranks. As a result of this Board's deliberations, some 280 officers were designated as CARS, 263 officers as CARSOs (104 of them as CARS/CARSOs).

Subsequent to 1971 the Bureau of Personnel continued to refine its views regarding subspecialization and developed a number of categories of subspecialties which were to be dovetailed into the regular line officer structure. This program eventually acquired the title of "Operational/Technical/Managerial System," colloquially known as OTMS. Each subspecialty was to be given a series of code numbers, and those officers who possessed the necessary qualifications (due either to experience or training) would be assigned an appropriate code. Ideally, those officers would then devote a large share of their career to billets requiring their subspecialty skills. Officers who were particularly well qualified were not only to receive a numerical code, but the additional title of "proven subspecialist." The objective here was to develop a cadre of experts who could fill the key billets in a particular subspecialist area and substantially improve the Navy's ability to manage or deal with problems requiring more than normal line experience. Hopefully, officers would aspire to become "proven subspecialists" and, in turn, be rewarded accordingly in terms of assignments and promotions. As the Bureau fleshed out the concept and began to form groups of subspecialists, it was inevitable that attention would eventually be drawn to the CARS/CARSO communities.

It was the opinion of the Bureau that those officers designated as CARS officers were not subspecialists in the context of OTMS, but on the other hand, that the CARSO community lent itself to integration within the overall OTMS. In a sense, CARSOs were proven subspecialists in the politico-military field, and for the sake of management uniformity, it made considerable sense to fold them into the OTMS program. Hence, the October 1973 Selection Board was tasked to identify officers for coding as Politico-Military/Strategic Planning Subspecialists (71XX Subspecialty Series). This title was to

replace the CARSO title to be consistent with other sub-specialties in OTMS. The current 71XX Subspecialty Series is defined in OPNAVINST 1211.6D of 8 January 1973.

2. Politico-Military Planner. First, the Board had no quarrel with the traditional categorization of politico-military planner and the breakdown previously used under the CARSO system. Accordingly, the Board developed the following definition and assigned the indicated codes:

7110 - POLITICO-MILITARY PLANNER - Contributes to the development of U.S. National objectives toward other nations, regions, and regional organizations in concert with other departments and agencies of the government.

Develops political rationale for use in formulating broad conceptual policies and strategies in pursuit of U.S. national objectives. Evaluates political ramifications and consequences of military decisions, pointing out political advantages or disadvantages of various courses of action. Evaluates political events and attitudes of other nations for their effect on existing and planned U.S. national policies and military strategies.

The politico-military planner is represented by five sub-specialty areas, four reflecting expertise in major geographic regions and one recognizing expertise in international negotiations and/or organizations. The last subspecialty area also includes officers who have competence in the general politico-military field, but not as a regional specialist.

Codes were assigned as follows:

7110	Political-Military Planner
7111	Political-Military Planner (Middle East, Africa, or South Asia)
7112	Political-Military Planner (Far East or Pacific)
7113	Political-Military Planner (Western Hemisphere)
7114	Political-Military Planner (Europe)

7115

Political-Military Planner  
(General, International Organization  
Negotiations)

3. Strategic Planner. The Board considered that there was a need to identify, separate, and code within the Politico-Military/Strategic Planning community, officers who are skilled in relating the military element of power to national objectives and that the politico-military categories did not fill this need. Consequently, it was the consensus of the Board that these individuals should be labeled "strategic planners." The officers within the Navy whom the Board determined were in need of identification, were those individuals who were skilled in:

a. Developing broad conceptual military plans and strategies in support of national policy and the military force requirements to achieve these objectives, in the context of assessed and projected threats..

b. Defining specific strategies and courses of action to support policy objectives through use of available assets under selected military conditions.

c. Designing strategic options for use of these assets for crisis management.

Most, if not all of the other OTMS subspecialty areas, including the Politico-Military group, have a direct connection with specific academic fields. In the case of strategic planning there appears to be no readily identifiable area of study. Experience and performance in the strategic planning arena serve as the training and qualification grounds for this subspecialty group. Specific duty assignment with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J3 and J5); the OPNAV Staff (Ops-02, 06, and 96); the OSD and NSC Staffs; the plans divisions of unified or fleet CINC staffs, are in the Board's opinion, examples of where the requisite experience can be gained to meet the above criteria. Studies and analyses which contribute directly to the development of strategic plans are also an adjunct to strategic planning. This does not mean, however, that all studies and analyses relating to military planning would so qualify an individual as a Strategic Planner. Tactical, doctrinal and weapons deployment studies and analyses, are examples which require a different type of expertise and which are not considered as directly related to strategic planning skills.

Accordingly, the Board developed the following definition and assigned the indicated code:

7120 - Strategic Planner - Develop broad conceptual military plans and strategy in support of national policy and the military forces requirements to achieve these objectives in the context of assessed and projected threats. Defines specific strategies and courses of action to support policy objectives through optimum use of available assets under selected contingency conditions; or strategic options for use of these assets for crises management.

4. Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare). The Board believed that the term strategic planner in and of itself led to some confusion with the term "strategic" as used in referring to nuclear war and associated problems. Consequently, the Board perceived a need for further categories in the strategic area to eliminate any further misunderstanding. The concept of a strategic planner specializing in the area of nuclear warfare is not new. As early as 1970, staff work regarding billet identification of those positions which required particular expertise in the area of strategic nuclear planning was undertaken. The need for identification of officers with this expertise received high level attention when, in May 1972 in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, VADM Kent Lee, then Deputy Director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, commented that the Bureau of Naval Personnel was studying the concept of a subspecialty code for strategic nuclear planners and recommended that this type of officer be identified. His rationale stemmed primarily from the need to re-tour officers to the degree necessary to provide extremely well qualified personnel in the top billets.

Based upon the requirements set forth in the letter of VADM Lee, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that a plan for implementing such a program be established together with periodic reports on progress made toward placing top performing, experienced officers in key strategic nuclear planning billets.

In August 1973, a new subspecialty code of 7170, Strategic Warfare Planner, was added to the 71XX series (Politico-Military/Strategic Planning) in order to recognize the specialized knowledge and skills required for the development and employment of strategic weapons systems and forces. The Board was of the opinion that inclusion of this subspecialty in 71XX codes recognized the interaction between strategic warfare planners and politico-military planners. In turn, identification of Strategic Warfare Planner subspecialists

and selection of proven subspecialists within this area was assigned as part of the responsibility of the Politico-Military/Strategic Planning Selection Board.

The formal definition on which this subspecialty was to be based was contained in reference (c) as follows:

STRATEGIC WARFARE PLANNER

"Serves on the staffs on those unified and Service commanders charged with responsibility for the planning for and conduct of strategic nuclear war. Prepares plans to support the Single Integrated Operational Plan; advises the command on the readiness of assigned forces to implement such plans; acts for the commander in directing the operation of such forces. Alternatively, serves in billets within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Joint Staff, or Joint Agencies involving planning of or preparation for strategic nuclear war. In this capacity, assists in formulation of broad policy and concepts regarding nuclear warfare as well as in preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan."

Using the above as a point of departure, the Board concluded that this definition was too narrow as it would not enable the Board to adequately identify all those individuals with strategic planner expertise in the nuclear warfare area. Although, in the Board's view, it would be improper to classify all those who do nuclear operational planning into the same OTMS subspecialty as general strategic planning, it appeared that those individuals having expertise in the development of a concept of operations for a major nuclear warfare operational plan, such as the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), required identification. This view appears consistent with the intent of the definition of Strategic Warfare Planner included in reference (c). The Board considered that with some modifications, the above Strategic Warfare Planner definition could be used to describe individuals who performed nuclear warfare "operational" planning.

The definition did not, in the Board's view, however, adequately identify those individuals who possessed strategic planning experience in the nuclear warfare policy area; specifically, the development of broad policy and doctrine for the conduct of strategic nuclear warfare; formulation of broad policy objectives for nuclear systems acquisition and their deployment; and international negotiations concerning

nuclear weapons constraints, among others. These policy and doctrinal planners are a vital and important element of the strategic planning community and required separate identification. Consequently, the Board determined that there was a need to identify not one but two separate groups of individuals, i.e., Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare Policy Plans) and Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare Operational Plans).

In recognition of the two distinct fields of expertise involved in the nuclear warfare planning area, policy and operational, the Board considered it appropriate to code these groups of individuals under a Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare) (7130) subspecialty code as either Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare Policy Plans) (7131) or Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare Operational Plans) (7132). Accordingly, the Board developed the following definitions and codes:

7130 - Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare) - Develops broad policies, doctrines and plans for the conduct of strategic and regional nuclear warfare, subdivided into subspecialty areas as follows:

7131 - Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare Policy Plans) Develops broad policies and doctrine for the conduct of strategic and regional nuclear warfare; formulates policy guidance for the selection of nuclear attack options; formulates broad policy objectives for nuclear systems acquisition and their deployment; and participates in international negotiations concerning nuclear weapons constraints, and in the development of policy declarations related to nuclear warfare strategy.

7132 - Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare Operational Plans) - Develops plans involving the conduct of strategic and regional nuclear war and assists in the formulation of broad policy and concepts regarding nuclear warfare. Participates in the development of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, supporting plans and/or regional nuclear warfare plans. Alternatively, serves in positions having as a primary responsibility the function of providing, to responsible authorities, advice and assistance on the details of such plans, and assessment of the adequacy of nuclear forces.

5. Politico-Military Postgraduate. The Board identified a host of officers who hold masters degrees in international

relations, foreign affairs, and political science (or related fields). There are perhaps 10% more who appear to have participated in a program leading to an advanced degree but either did not obtain the degree or lacked corroborative evidence in their jackets. The Board was of the unanimous opinion that officers in this category who did not have substantive (qualifying) experience related to any of the other coded categories should be assigned a separate and distinct code. The purpose here was both to recognize the individual's accomplishments and to give the Navy an inventory of its educational assets in this field. No attempt was made to distinguish between self-obtained and Navy-sponsored (usually one or two years in residence) degrees. Accordingly, the Board developed the following category and code:

7160 - Politico-Military Postgraduate - Identifies those officers who possess a graduate degree in International Relations, Foreign Affairs or Political Science\* awarded by an accredited college or university, but have not acquired further qualifying experience.

5. Politico-Military/Strategic Planner. Very early in the selection process it was clear that a few officers had acquired qualifying experience in both the politico-military planning and strategic planning areas. These officers represent a particularly valuable pool of broad gauge talent and the Board felt impelled to code these officers in a distinctive fashion. Accordingly, the Board developed the following definition and code:

7100 - Politico-Military/Strategic Planner - Possesses broad politico-military/strategic planning experience, and has demonstrated superior performance in billets encompassing a wide spectrum of both politico-military and strategic planning responsibilities. Develops, or contributes to the development of, U. S. national objectives, broad conceptual policies, plans and military strategies.

6. Force Program Planner (not coded). A great deal of thought and discussion was given by the Board to an officer tentatively to be identified as a Force Program Planner. The definition considered for this subspecialty was:

FORCE PROGRAM PLANNER

"Develops alternate major force structures based on present strategic concepts and objectives within fiscal constraints; and measures the impact of policy

\*Other graduate degrees may qualify depending on course content.

and procurement decisions on present and future defense posture. Expresses force structures in terms of time-phased allocations of resources, i.e., personnel, money and material."

Although some individuals were identified in this area, they were too few to justify a distinguishing code and to overcome the reservations of the Board. The central question was: Do force programmers participate in the formulation of strategy to the degree which warrants inclusion in the strategic planner community? There was a wide divergence of opinions among the Board members and it was therefore considered that further study should be conducted in this area to resolve this issue. Further, the Board was uncertain that this subspecialty properly falls within the 71XX series. Sponsorship may, in fact, be an Op-090 (or related office) function and responsibility. Additionally, all records of individuals with this experience were not presented to the Board and consequently it was not possible to properly identify the entire group with this type of experience. Those individuals who were tentatively so identified by the Board were either assigned to other Politico-Military/Strategic Planning subspecialty codes, or were recommended for consideration in other subspecialty areas. Again, the Board strongly recommends that BUPERS, in conjunction with the community sponsor, carefully examine this issue and determine whether the next selection Board should, in fact, consider an additional code.

7. Composite 71XX Coding Structure. The following table summarizes the 71XX coding structure recommended by the Board:

Politico-Military Strategic Planning Subspecialty Codes

7XXX Series	Social Sciences
71XX Series	<u>Politico-Military/Strategic Planning</u>
7100	Politico-Military/Strategic Planner
Politico-Military	
7110	Political-Military Planner
7111	Political-Military Planner (Middle East, Africa, or South Asia)
7112	Political-Military Planner (Far East or Pacific)



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highly desirable. From hard  
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intended acc msn WC.  
Therefore X

2. Suggest 2 avenues reduce  
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See with after w/pectn - not other  
W/C

- 7113 Political-Military Planner  
(Western Hemisphere)
- 7114 Political-Military Planner  
(Europe)
- 7115 Political-military Planner  
(General, International Organization Negotiations)
- Strategic
- 7120 Strategic Planner
- 7130 Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare)
- 7131 Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare  
Policy Plans)
- 7132 Strategic Planner (Nuclear Warfare  
Operational Plans)

Graduate Education

- 7160 Politico-Military Postgraduate
- 

7111-7114 subspecialty area qualifications include familiarity with the operations and policies of, and U.S. participation in, regional defense alliance organizations in the area (e.g., Europe NATO; Pacific and Far East - SEATO).

7115 - international organizations and negotiations are those of global scope (e.g., the United Nations, Law of the Sea Conference) not including regional organizations and bilateral negotiations.

Amuse myself & 2 hrs  
B-1 NWC course  
NWC degree = equivalent  
Trust as such  
Must have @ WC

Loss of degree - free good  
Agree - Task WC fulfill mission  
CWA not paid

DeLoe  
Kramer  
Coffey







PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, Rhode Island  
02840

2 APR 1974

Dear Rich,

Certainly was good to see you at the MECC meeting. I thought your contributions were most helpful to us. I also hope that the MECC is going to turn into a more useful body than the tea party I observed last year! It seems to me that you have ~~advised~~ *advised* us and stirred us up enough so that perhaps we will become serious about working together and coming up with some common solutions. I certainly hope so.

I also most appreciate your willingness to obtain an informal clearance for us to take in civilian students. I think your solution is a very good one. There is no point in trying to get all this interservice coordination and cooperation until we have proved whether it is both feasible and desirable. If there is anything I can do to help on this, please let me know.

In the meantime I would like again to invite you to come up and see what's happening at the Naval War College since you were last here. Might I suggest that you join us for our annual meeting of the Board of Advisors from noon of the 24th of May through noon on the 25th, (that is a Friday noon to a Saturday noon)? I intend to ask the Board to have lunch with students on Friday and to attend seminars with them that afternoon. The next morning I will ask for their views on what they have seen and for their suggestions on what we can and should be doing better. I am enclosing a copy of a recent letter to the Board of Advisors. It outlines for them the areas in which I would most appreciate their help and gives an idea of where I think we should be going next.

If you cannot join us for that, I would simply be delighted if you could come up at any time for half a day or a day. I would like to work with your office on the date,

however, so that we are sure to have some seminars in session. I think you can get a good feel for the state of military education and for the type of people we are educating by sitting in the classrooms with them by yourself.

Again thanks for your help at the MECC and warm regards.

Yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Stansfield' or similar, with a stylized flourish at the end.

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable M. Richard Rose  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Education)  
The Pentagon, Room 3D258  
Washington, DC 20301

2/8/74



PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, Rhode Island  
02840

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD OF ADVISORS

Academic Year 1973-74 has been dedicated to the consolidation and refinement of the extensive curricula revisions made last year. With one trimester past, I believe we are well along the right track toward that goal. It is now time to outline our objectives for 1974-75 and begin initial planning.

I am particularly interested in your views on where we should go from here. My preliminary thought is that we should look in two directions: 1) stabilizing what we have achieved; and, 2) extending services to the Navy as a whole through our correspondence courses, dialogues between the faculty and the naval establishment, and increased communication with the civilian intellectual community.

I have jotted down some ideas on how we might move in these directions next year. I hope that you will look these over and select two or three which particularly interest you or suggest some others. Then, if, as I mentioned in my last letter, you could take time to come up here individually before our next meeting, you could dig into those items with a variety of people on campus. Then when we meet in May we could all bring our ideas together and develop a strong policy thrust for next year.

I propose that our annual meeting take place on 24 and 25 May 1974, but will want to hear how that meets with all of your plans.

Do look forward to having you visit the campus again before long.

Warm regards,

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE LONG-RANGE PLAN

Objectives for Next Year

1. Stabilize the current program.
2. Extend NWC services to a larger Navy community.

Issues Relating to Program Stabilization

1. Curriculum Content

- a. Does the curriculum content lack balance?

Realizing that the price of adding something to the curriculum is having to make room for it by dropping something else out, should topics be added on the Far East, Latin America, etc.?

- b. Should there be more flexibility to permit some students to move at a faster pace as with a college elective program?

- c. Should we be teaching more about the political aspects in decision-making (International Relations/Law)?

- d. Should a block of time be devoted to International Law? Should it be integrated into extant courses? What should it replace?

- e. In a course on fundamentals, is a single student research paper on one subject of more or less value than a number of shorter essays on several subjects?

2. Students

- a. How can we attract the Navy's best young officers? What can we do to make them want to come to the College and make the Detailers want to send them?

3. College of Naval Warfare/College of Naval Command and Staff

- a. Should both schools be continued?

An average of only fifteen percent of CNW students have attended a C&S course. Both of our courses are now virtually the same.

- b. Should we create a special Masters Degree granting program in Military Science beyond the CNC&S/CNW level?

The Soviets have an MA and PhD program in Military Science open to very small numbers of military professionals.

Some candidates might be potential CNO's, others simply innovative thinkers, singled out for their intellectual qualities. In creating this special program we would be making the NWC more of a university. Is that desirable?

4. Faculty

- a. How can we best attract and maintain a high grade faculty?

- b. What opportunities can be given to the faculty to enable them to keep abreast of their discipline? (research, colloquia, symposia, etc.)

- c. Long term appointments have been extended to one-third of the Strategy faculty. Is this the right amount to assure continuity yet not lock the NWC irrevocably into the present program or court the hazards of tenure that many universities face?

- d. We are looking into a 5-year program of tenure for the Management faculty. During 1 of the middle years the individual would have to seek employment elsewhere to keep current, returning to the NWC to complete his 5-year contract. He would be salaried by the NWC for only 4 of the 5 years. What do you think of the feasibility of this plan?

5. War Gaming Installation

- a. How can this best be used? We are delaying the commitment of substantial investment funds until we are sure where we are going.

6. Professional Development Course

- a. Should we establish a short, professional military course for more Lieutenants?

Preliminary thinking would ascribe four objectives to the course:

- (1) To enhance retention by offering the officer an overview of the broad purposes and importance of the U.S. Navy.

(2) To reduce parochialism by exposing the officer to all warfare areas of the Navy.

(3) To instill a foundation in staff procedures (which is necessarily one element slighted in making the C&S and CNW courses similar).

(4) To provide a uniform base of knowledge at the Lieutenant Commander entry level.

7. Naval Staff Course/Naval Command College

a. We have experimented with the international students following the CNW/CNC&S curriculum and with integrating them partially into portions of the CNW curriculum. Both have worked satisfactorily. Should the international students be kept by themselves, partially integrated, or fully integrated with the American students?

8. Current Strategy Forum (CSF)/Global Strategy Discussions (GSD)

a. GSD was beginning to get out of hand both in the numbers of participants and the level of social activities. CSF-73 attempted to correct this problem by reducing the conference from 5 to 2½ days, the participants from 1000 to 600, and the stress from social to academic. CSF is still too big for serious intellectual discussion. Accepting the desirable public relations aspects, CSF remains difficult to integrate into the curriculum and justify academically as a worthwhile expenditure of student/NWC time. In what direction should we go?

9. Grading/Examinations

a. This remains a controversial subject both with students and faculty. Exams are a learning experience and provide students with a measure of understanding of course concepts. They offer the faculty a gauge of teaching effectiveness. Still, some students feel examinations are counter-productive in a graduate school environment. Should examinations be eliminated? Should grades be eliminated? Should grading be simply Pass/Fail or on an A,B,C,F, system? Is motivation for a "Superior" necessary/helpful/desirable?

b. What mechanism would we use for selecting Distinguished Graduates? Could we base selection of a Distinguished Graduate on some original intellectual contribution during the academic year rather than course grades?

Issues Relating to Extending NWC Services to a Larger Navy Community

10. Strategy Department

Should the Strategy Department participate in long range strategic studies with the Center for Naval Analysis or CNO's office. What resources would be necessary?

11. Management Department

Should we slightly overstaff the Management Department so that Navy-wide management issues can be explored here or in conjunction with Washington agencies. Typical topics:

a. How could you reduce the size of the Navy support element?

b. How can you measure success of specific recruiting programs?

12. Tactics Department

Should we develop a section which would review fleet exercise reports and feed the best ideas/conclusions back to fleet staffs? This would mean additional staff members who would be away from their teaching during the reviews. But, they would return to their classes with new concepts and fresh ideas. How much danger is there to becoming consumed as an annex to CINCLANTFLT and getting away from our academic purposes?

13. Center for Continuing Education (CCE)

The CCE will complete the translation of the new curriculum into correspondence courses this summer.

a. Should we provide these to the fleet like the PACE program? (video taped lectures, local NWC graduates as on-site instructors, etc.)

b. Should we consider developing preliminary, required courses, in Strategy, Management, and Tactics to give entering students a common core program before they arrive in Newport? Is this an effective way around the problem of needing both CNC&S and CNW?

c. Should we develop a set of correspondence courses to carry on from where the resident program stops? Should this be tied in with a resident MA in Military Science program?

d. How can the resident academic departments support the program? Should course grading/lesson correction be done by the academic departments?

14. Advanced Research Program

a. How can it best support the rest of the Navy yet retain the independence requisite to basic/pure (vice applied) research?

b. This program is now operating on an informal OP-090 grant which has been reduced for next year from \$150,000 to \$100,000. Should this program be regularized and funding established? What would be the best method for accomplishing this?

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LGEN Jaskilka	Rm 2036- AA	OX-48003
<del>LGEN Rogers</del>	<del>Rm 2E736</del>	<del>OX-56003</del>
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Dean Krogh	Office - Foreign Service School Georgetown University	625-2518
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*Tap file*

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FM PRESNAVWARCOL NEWPORT RI  
TO CH NAVSEC US MILGRP BRAZIL  
BT

UNCLAS //NO0000//

PERSONAL FOR RADM HANSON FROM VADM TURNER

1. THOR, HAVE HAD TO DROP OUT OF THE RHODES BOARD MEETING 18 APRIL  
AT ANNAPOLIS. WOULD LIKE TO GET TOGETHER PM 17 APRIL IN D.C.. I  
HAVE AN ENGAGEMENT UNTIL APPROX 2100 BUT HAVE QTRS P-1 RESERVED FOR  
US BOTH. YOU CAN STILL MAKE USNA BY 0830 ON THURSDAY IF YOU WON.  
PLEASE ADVISE. STAN

BT

#0654

NNNN

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11/211

PRIORITY

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WASHINGTON SCHEDULE

17 - 18 APRIL 1974

Wednesday, 17 April 1974

TAB

1130 - Leave Retreat	
1230 - Allegheny Flight #892	
1340 - Arrive National Airport - met by CNO car (At disposal for entire visit)	
1400 - Meet <u>RADM Hanson</u> in RADM Read's Office	
- - YNCS Duplicate Original of Evaluation (President Selection Board - Room G734)	A
1430 - Call on RADM Read	
Personnel status	B
1500 - Call on VADM Bagley	
Draft letter to Bayne Wilson, 3 stars	C
1530 - Call on LTGEN Samuel Jaskilka, USMC, Rm 2034	
Keever letter	D
1630 - Academic Sherry, Dean Krogh's Office 36th and N Streets Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.	E
1700 - Nash Lecture by Mr. William Bundy	F
List of VADM Turner's personal guests	G
Reception IHO Mr. Bundy following in Copley Lounge	
2000 - Dinner at Dean Krogh's home 2 Wynkoop Court, Bethesda, Maryland	H
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2100 - Quarters P-1	

Thursday, 18 April 1974

TAB

0945 - CNO	
Bates Professorship	
Draft letter to VADM Bayne	I
Missions	
Letter to CNO	J
Precis (3)	K
Single Page Precis (6)	L
Letter from USS OWENS	M
Letter from Proceedings	N
Preference List	O
Status of Colbert Dedication	
Herrington: Co-Author book on	
Naval Policy	
CNET Command Relationship	
-     -     Mr. Robert Murray	P
1100 -     Appointment	
Flag List	Q
1200 -     RADM Train (Lunch)	
CDR Nepier V. Smith	R
Net Assessment Missions	S
-     -     RADM Crowe	
Draft Letter	T
-     -     General Bernie Rogers	
Jackly Point Paper	U
-     -     Honorable M. Richard Rose	V
1440 -     Allegheny Flight #945	
1545 -     Arrive T. F. Green	
1630 -     Arrive NAVWARCOL	

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		Net Assessment Missions	S

-	-	RADM Crowe	
		Draft Letter	T

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M. Richard ROSE DEP ASS. SECDEF (EDUCATION)	RM 3D262	OX 70617

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND  
02840

11 April 1974

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL TURNER

SUBJ: Visit to LTG Rogers

1. (O'Brien). Reminder: Father Peterson, PC, never sent the letter I requested and, consequently, O'Brien was assigned to the Army C&GSC, Ft. Leavenworth.

Comment: In all candor, this is an internal Army problem. If you consider it an obligation to bring it up because of O'Brien's telephone call, please be advised that this will cause a fair amount of "flap" and could decrement your leverage vis-a-vis the Robinson case (par 2).

2. (Robinson). Facts: LTC(P) Richard T. Robinson, Corps of Engineers, had been assigned to head up a computer systems office in San Francisco. For that plus a strong personal desire to be stationed there (wife is Japanese) I omitted (with ADM Williams' concurrence) his name on your original list called in to BG Forrest three weeks ago. You will recall that we got McLain as a result. Robinson is now scheduled to be the Plans and Training Officer for the Engineer Training Center, Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo. I tried to break this loose on 9 April through the Colonels' Branch, but without success. We are authorized five Army officers, three colonels and two LTC's. We will have for next year:

COL. McLain (CNW)

COL. Guertin (departs Jan 75)

LTC Whalen (CNW)

MAJ(P) Hogan

LTC Gallup (.99 probable retirement this year. Also our only engineer)

NB LTC Pietsch will be reassigned in July to HQ FORSCOM

3. (Hutton, Cuthbert P.). Facts: He attended the NC&S course of 1971. He was an alternate selectee for a war college this year. The assignment officer added him to the Naval War College list without checking his C&S schooling. Upon re-checking, he deleted Hutton. There is a standing rule that an officer who attends a C&S course at another service will not return to that service's senior service college.

Comment: I'm sure an exception could be made. Hutton would really be in his element with this curriculum.



Comment: Presume you will discuss this with him.

Very respectfully,

L. W. JACKLEY

COL / INF

Senior Army Advisor

FYI

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17 - 18 APRIL  
1974

Wednesday, 17 April 1974

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- List of Personal Guets
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- 2000 Dinner at Dean Krogh's home  
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- 2100 Meet RADM Hanson at Qtrs P-1

A

B

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Thursday, 18 April 1974

TAB

- Admiral Hooper at WNY  
Letter  
0945 CNO  
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Letter to CNO  
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DRAFT

CNO Letterhead

Dear Duke:

On the 4th of December I indicated in a letter to you my support for your efforts to foster a broader association with the Washington area academic community. Since then I have had an opportunity to give your program more thought and, quite frankly, have developed some reservations. Although your PROTAP Program has many attractive features, it also presents problems worthy of further consideration;

First, upon review of the ten disciplines identified as PROTAP areas of study, I notice only Political Science relates to validated Navy billet requirements. There are only 80 P-coded billets in the Navy in Political Science and, of those, only 58 are identified for 05/06 officers.

Second, the cost of detailing officers for an extra four months to a Senior Service College to participate in PROTAP appears to me to not be a very effective way of spending money, especially in view of the limited Navy need for officers with graduate work or degrees in the ten disciplines of PROTAP.

Third, your successor's hands may be tied by having to maintain the National War College curriculum in consonance with the participating consortium of Washington area universities. It seems to me that it would be

Draft

difficult to expand or modify the National War College curriculum while involved in PROTAP, since, presumably, the participating consortium universities would have to base considerable amount of their degree credit upon the National War College course.

Finally, I worry a bit about the subtle pressures that the PROTAP Program may exert on our officers to pursue advanced degrees as points for promotion rather than because they want or need education for professional reasons.

No doubt you have weighed these, and other, arguments and may be able to persuade me that my doubts are not well founded. Accordingly, I will look forward to hearing from you on this matter.

Warm regards,

E.R. ZUMWALT, JR.  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Vice Admiral M.G. Bayne, U.S. Navy  
Commandant, The National War College  
Washington, D.C. 20319



PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, Rhode Island  
02840

11 APR 1974

Dear Ed,

My sincere appreciation for your long and thoughtful letter. I am quite pleased that you took the time both to read my Review article so closely and to comment upon it. As a matter of interest, that same article has been published in a volume of our selected readings for the Tactics course. Thus, our students not only are required to read the paper but have the opportunity to discuss it and to toss around in seminars their ideas on the Navy's missions.

One of your many specific comments was on the vagueness and lack of understanding of the presence mission. I believe this to be an exciting area for study and one in which we need some innovative thinking. One of the young civilian scholars we are supporting through our Advanced Research Program is completing an exhaustive research effort on U.S. Naval presence in the Mediterranean. The young man, Edward Luttwak, is a British-Israeli citizen and a Ph.D. candidate at Johns Hopkins. Ed is approximately two-thirds finished with his research and, I understand, is planning on publishing his results. He is a very promising scholar; his published work should add a great deal to existing thinking on the subject.


I have passed your comments on Clyde Smith's article along to him. I did want to reassure you, however, on the potential impact of the article on Review readers. Our purpose in publishing such works is to provoke discussion and debate among all readers, not simply our students. Nevertheless, I honestly do not believe the students will take Clyde's ideas as gospel. They will certainly think about them and digest them, along with the comments on Gorshkov which are appearing in the Proceedings.

You mentioned a few authors and their writings on War Colleges. I am familiar with Ronald Spector; he has an application for financial support of another project in with our Advanced Research Department. Under the same program, we are actually funding Gerald Kennedy's dissertation.

This response has turned out to be longer than I intended, but I did want to let you know how much I appreciate your letter.

Hope to see you up here again soon. Warm regards.

Yours,



STANSFIELD TURNER  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret.)  
Director of Naval History and  
Curator for the Navy Department  
Building 200  
Washington Navy Yard  
Washington, DC 20374

NAVAL HISTORY DIVISION  
BG 220, WASHINGTON NAVY YARD  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20374

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL HISTORY AND  
CURATOR FOR THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

22 March 1974

005  
001 Reply  
002  
11  
Dear Stan,

I am starting what I fear will be an unduly long letter, but I understand reading is now in style at the War College.

The letter is stimulated by the March-April issue of the Naval War College Review. My purpose is twofold. The first to congratulate you on the lead article and advance a few thoughts in extension of its subject matter. The second, prompted by one of the other articles, is to emphasize the dangers of channelized thinking in the area covered and the need for the students to do their own thinking--a matter you have stressed in your changes at the College.

As to your article, it is excellent from two points of view. First of all, it is healthy to give the students and faculty evidence that their college president is engaged in exploring concepts of naval warfare, the roles of the United States Navy, naval strategy, the means of applying naval power, and the tactical utilization of that power. Secondly, I concur with the need to start with missions, or as you say, output.

I am sure you will continue to project your thinking still further along these lines.

When I finished reading the article, I broke out the study Budgets and Programs, Naval Long-Range Studies Project, February 1961. Based on research in progress, Bill Reitzel, Troy Stone, I, and others in the small group, located at the War College, put it together in something like four days when we learned Charlie Hitch was appointed to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense. It urged Navy initiative in its approach to the budget and justification--in anticipation of changes which Hitch was bound to introduce. In view of the urgency, the proposal was not a radical restructuring but built on existing program concepts. (My impression was that the Navy decision makers were too busy to read the brief study since actions were not then forthcoming.)



By the way, Hitch had already spoken of "thinking in terms of programs that perform tasks and yield end products..., rather than of actions which yield objects."

I am glad to see you tying things together with your crossed arrows and bar. As result of the National Security Act of 1947, the statutory and executive changes of 1949, 1953, 1958, and other actions, I was strongly convinced that the Navy needed a mission-oriented unifying theme. Eisenhower had claimed that naval, air, and ground warfare was gone forever. We have since continued further along that disasterous line as a result of OSD, the changes to the JCS functions and the joint staff, and trends in unified commands. The tendency is to approach all, or almost all, operations as a multi-Service problem, even when they could best be solved by a single Service.

I came up with the phrase "Sea Control" for this purpose, since it seemed a prerequisite for most, if not all, naval missions. I said "It appears, however, that the addition of 'Sea Control' as a basic program category would be a mandatory minimum change." To quote further from the study--

From time to time, attempts have been made by this Project, amongst others, to come up with a single impelling strategic concept to explain naval power and roles of the Navy. No such single concept has been uncovered; even Mahan's concepts had diverse aspects. Control, use, and denial of the seas come closest to filling the bill. For this reason, "Sea Control," appears to be the most informative expression. Its use, throughout the Navy on all occasions seems in order.

*Ed Nuttall*  
Turning now to "Naval Presence," you have correctly stated that this probably is the least understood of all Navy missions. This, it seems to me, would be a most profitable area for study in depth. I know of studies of incidents and treatment of periods of history such as the time of what some call "gunboat diplomacy." Yet I have never read what I thought was adequate treatment of the subject as a whole. Historical primary and secondary source materials on the subject are plentiful. Many cover earlier parts of this century. The post-World War II experiences have not yet been treated extensively, and we have the recent examples of Soviet use of naval presence. In short, I have a feeling that perceptive analysis of historical examples might yield great benefits.

One nitpick, my impression of the North Sea barrage differs from that in the article. The concept had been rejected by the British. When the United States entered the war in April 1917,

the Bureau of Ordnance proposed the use of an antenna-type mine based on a newly developed principle. Fourteen months later, the mine had been developed, produced, and delivered overseas in quantity, a squadron of ships had been specially equipped to lay them and planting commenced. The field was completed on 24 October 1918, less than 3 weeks before the Armistice. Nevertheless, U-boats were damaged or sunk, the first on 9 July. Some historians state that the strain on U-boat personnel of the long passage through the field was great and that the circulating of stories throughout the submarine force undermined its morale and contributed substantially to speed the collapse. I don't know whether this was a factor in the mutiny in the German Navy.

The other article on which I wish to comment is Commander Clyde Smith's on the "Gorshkov Articles." It is well written and I agree with most of his analyses of parts of the articles. At the same time, I feel that for students to take as fact some of his assumptions or conclusions (many of which go beyond what I extract from the articles) would be most unfortunate. He is a competent intelligence officer and I respect his opinions, even when mine differ. Whoever is right, I believe other alternatives need to be examined. I hope he and others will do so.

My most serious concerns are with his statements as to "Differing Strategies," and the almost categorical statements that "Soviet naval strategy is defensive and deterrent." Whatever his intention, and my impression, may be overdrawn, I am concerned of the impact on the reader.

Earlier experiences have led to caution about basing planning and programs on assumptions of enemy intentions, as opposed to capabilities. The author backs up his assumption or conclusion on such sources as Herrick's book and Funkhouser's article in the Proceedings. I disagree with them both on this point. In this connection, my most recent discussion with Herrick led me to conclude that he was now modifying his assessment.

Intelligence estimates after World War II, as I recall them, invariably insisted on a Russian defensive strategy and that as a result their submarine program would essentially be confined to coastal types--even after evidence of longer range types appeared. Later the assumption, drawing upon some Soviet statements, was that the latter were for defensive purposes, particularly defending against carrier deployments into the Norwegian Sea. This certainly was one of their purposes, but we should not disregard additional possibilities. The Soviets have drawn extensively on the German U-boat experiences whereby the sinkings in two world wars almost caused the defeat of Britain. As I view it, this was primarily an offensive German strategy. (The author does later mention Gorshkov's discussion of a mission of interdicting Western sea routes.)

Although I don't mean to oversimplify what Commander Smith has written, I shall mention a few other assumptions that I think are dangerous, namely: the assumptions with regard to future Soviet amphibious capabilities, the conclusion that the lack of Soviet forward bases will likely remain in arrears for a number of years (despite evidence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean), the observation about the lack of advanced methods of Soviet sea cargo transportation, and statements which may overstate our capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviet Navy. We must not engage in wishful thinking.

I do not wish to be overly critical. Much of the article is superb. And in the conclusion, he does qualify his views. My hope is that others will evaluate them critically.

What seems to me the best assessment of the Gorshkov articles as a whole is a paper done by Captain Wooldridge, a research fellow at the National War College. He has offered it to the Naval Institute. I doubt if they will accept it, since they hope to get one from our CNO. The Wooldridge paper would, I believe, be a useful complement to Smith's article if published in your Review.

Another subject. I was most impressed with another Commander Smith who visited us from the Naval War College concerning his research on the college from World War II to 1970.

As to the possible War College history, here are some sources which may be of interest, realizing you probably know of them already. Two completed dissertations are:

*Was of interest  
read US-A-J  
the book*

— Spector, Ronald H., "Professors of War, The Naval War College and the Modern American Navy" (Yale, 1967) (covers early years).

Rilling, Alexander W., "The First Fifty Years of Graduate Education in the United States Navy" (USC, 1972) (covers 1909-1959).

*Was  
for book*

— A Mr. Gerald Kennedy (employed in the Declassification Division of the National Archives) is preparing a dissertation on the Naval War College as an education institution, 1919-1939. His school is the University of Minnesota. He hopes to complete the thesis in 1974.

Warm regards,

*Ech*  
EDWIN B. HOOPER  
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret)

3X5 Canal

18 APRIL : 1100

ROOM 3E941

TOM LATIMER

DRAFT

CNO Letterhead

Dear Duke:

On the 4th of December I indicated in a letter to you my support for your efforts to foster a broader association with the Washington area academic community. Since then I have had an opportunity to give your program more thought and, quite frankly, have developed some reservations. Although your PROTAP Program has many attractive features, it also presents problems worthy of further consideration:

First, upon review of the ten disciplines identified as PROTAP areas of study, I notice only Political Science relates to validated Navy billet requirements. There are only 80 P-coded billets in the Navy in Political Science and, of those, only 58 are identified for 05/06 officers.

Second, the cost of detailing officers for an extra four months to a Senior Service College to participate in PROTAP appears to me to not be a very effective way of spending money, especially in view of the limited Navy need for officers with graduate work or degrees in the ten disciplines of PROTAP.

Third, your successor's hands may be tied by having to maintain the National War College curriculum in consonance with the participating consortium of Washington area universities. It seems to me that it would be

Draft

difficult to expand or modify the National War College curriculum while involved in PROTAP, since, presumably, the participating consortium universities would have to base considerable amount of their degree credit upon the National War College course.

Finally, I worry a bit about the subtle pressures that the PROTAP Program may exert on our officers to pursue advanced degrees as points for promotion rather than because they want or need education for professional reasons.

No doubt you have weighed these, and other, arguments and may be able to persuade me that my doubts are not well founded. Accordingly, I will look forward to hearing from you on this matter.

Warm regards,

E.R. ZUMWALT, JR.  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Vice Admiral M.G. Bayne, U.S. Navy  
Commandant, The National War College  
Washington, D.C. 20319

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WASHINGTON SCHEDULE

17 - 18 APRIL  
1974

Wednesday, 17 April 1974

TAB

1130	Leave Retreat	
1230	Allegheny Flight #892	
1340	Arrive National Airport - met by CNO car (At disposal for entire visit)	
1400	Call on RADM Staring	
1430	Call on RADM Read	A
	Personnel status	
1500	Call on VADM Bagley (Draft ltr to Bayne) - Wilson, 3 stars	B
-	Call on LTGEN Samuel Jaskilka, USMC	C
	Keever letter	
1630	Academic Sherry Dean Krogh's Office Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.	D
	List of Personal Guets	E
1700	Nash Lecture by Mr. William Bundy Hall of Nations, the Edmund A. Walsh Bldg. School of Foreign Service, Georgetown Univ. (36th and N.)	F
	Reception IHO Mr. Bunday following in Copley Lunge	
2000	Dinner at Dean Krogh's home 2 Wynkoop Court, Bethesda, Maryland	G
2100	Meet RADM Hanson at Qtrs P-1	H

Thursday, 18 April 1974

TAB

-	Admiral Hooper at WNY	
	Letter	
0945	CNO	
	Bates Professorship	
	Draft letter to VADM Bayne	I
	Missions	
	Letter to CNO	J
	Precis (3)	K
	Single Page Precis (6)	L
	Letter from USS Owens	M
	Preference List	N
	Status of Colbert Dedication	
	Herrington: Co-Author book on	
	Naval Policy	
	CNET Command Relationship	
-	Mr. Robert Murray	O
	Missions Paper	
-	RADM Train (Lunch)	P
	Net Assessment Missions	
-	RADM Crowe	Q
	Draft Letter	
-	General Bernie Rogers	R
	Jackely Point Paper	
1440	- Allegheny Flight #945	
1545	- Arrive T. F. Green	
1630	- Arrive NAVWARCOL	

OTHER TABS

Letter to Honorable M. Richard Rose	S
(Deputy SECDEF (Education))	
Duplicate Original of YNCS Evaluation	T
(President Selection Board - BUPERS	
Room G734)	

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	Keever letter	
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A

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Personnel status

B

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Draft letter to Bayne  
Wilson, 3 stars

C

1530 - Call on LTGEN Samuel Jaskilka, USMC, Rm 2034

Keever letter

D

1630 - Academic Sherry, Dean Krogh's Office  
36th and N Streets  
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service  
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

E

1700 - Nash Lecture by Mr. William Bundy

F

List of VADM Turner's personal guests

G

Reception IHO Mr. Bundy following in  
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H

2100 - Quarters P-1

Thursday, 18 April 1974

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I  
J  
K  
L  
M  
N  
O

- - Mr. Robert Murray

P

1100 - Appointment

Flag List

Q

1200 - RADM Train (Lunch)

CDR Nepier V. Smith  
Net Assessment Missions

R  
S

- - RADM Crowe

Draft Letter

T

- - General Bernie Rogers

Jackly Point Paper

U

- - Honorable M. Richard Rose

V

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1545 - Arrive T. F. Green

1630 - Arrive NAVWARCOL



<u>BILLET</u>						
<u>RANK/NAME</u>	<u>DESIG</u>	<u>DESIG</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>PRD</u>	<u>RELIEF</u>	<u>DESIG</u> <u>ETA</u>
<u>OFFICE OF PRESIDENT</u>						
LCDR D.G. CLARK	1110	1110	LCDR	8/74		
<u>OFFICE OF DEPUTY</u>						
LCDR D.L. SCHNEIDER	1310	1300	LCDR	Gone	LCDR E.J. LISCHKE	1310 Stu
<u>STRATEGY</u>						
LTJG C.L. SYMONDS	1105	1000	CDR	9/74	CDR W.L. STEVENS	1310 Stu
<u>MANAGEMENT</u>						
CDR J.L. CARENZA	3100	3100	CDR	7/74	CAPT D.W. WHELAN	3100 8/74
CAPT R.V. HANSEN	1310	Excess		1/75	None	- -
Empty		1000	CDR		(Shift incumbent to TAC as KREKEL's relief)	- -
<u>TACTICS</u>						
CAPT C.K. MOORE	1110	1110	CAPT	6/74		
CAPT Wm. ABROMOTIS	1110	1000	CAPT	7/74	CDR J.F. McNULTY	1110 Stu
CDR L.E. KREKEL	1110	1120	CDR	6/74	CDR C.P. HAMMON	1310 Note
CDR W.G. CARSON	1110	1100	CDR	6/74	CDR L.R. EDWARDS	1310 Stu
CDR R.C. KEMPFR	1110	1110	LCDR	Gone	CDR H.B. KUYKENDALL	1110 Stu
CDR L.T. FUREY	1110	Excess		7/74	None	- -
CDR C.P. PFARRER	1110	Excess		7/74	None	- -
CDR D.R. MAHER	1110	Excess		7/74	None	- -
Note: Internal shift by HAMMON.						
<u>COMMAND AND STAFF</u>						
CDR J.H. GRAHAM	1310	Excess		7/74	None	- -
<u>NCC</u>						
CAPT C.O. BORGSTROM	1310	1000	CAPT	8/74		
CAPT W.K. MALLINSON	1110	1000	CAPT	5/74		
LCDR H.D. STURR	1820	1820	CDR	10/74	Pers nom	

NSC

CDR R.K. LOCKWOOD	1110	1110	CDR	6/74	CDR J.A. MAJOR	1110	Stu
LCDR J.A. MORIARTY	1310	3100	LCDR	9/74	LCDR L. ANDERSON	3100	8/74
LCDR J.A. LOFTUS	1110	1110	LCDR	7/74	LCDR E.L. GIBSON	1110	Stu

ADMIN

CDR J.B. MOORE	1630	1630	LCDR	7/74	LCDR G.C. STEIGER	1630	Stu
CDR T.J. MORAN	1310	Excess		6/74	None		
CDR C.F. AKE	1110	1100	LCDR	7/74	CDR L.L. ALLEY	1110	5/74

CCE

CDR R.C. TRAU	1310	1300	CDR	11/74	CDR E.F. ROLLINS	1310	Stu
CDR D.C. FAUL	3100	3100	LCDR	8/74	LCDR J.L. SMITH	3100	9/74
LCDR R.F. BECKHAM	1110	1100	LCDR	7/74	LCDR J.S. TURNER	1110	6/74

CWG

CDR R.N. BLATT	1310	1000	CDR	9/74			
CDR C.W. BUZZELL	1310	1000	CDR	7/74			
LCDR R.T. DAVIS	1310	1110	LCDR	Gone	LCDR B.V. TIERNAN	1110	
LCDR G.E. KOUBA	1110	1110	LCDR	4/74	LCDR C. CRIGLER	1110	
LCDR P.R. JACOBS	1310	1310	LCDR	7/74			
Empty		1310	LCDR	-	LT P.P. GUTELIUS	1110	4/74
LCDR J.D. SHEWCHUK	1110	1110	LCDR	8/74	LCDR A.M. RYBARCZYK	1110	8/74
Billet Being Established		1000	CDR	-	CDR R.D. LONGMAN	1110	4/74

(HUMAN RESC. MGMT)

SUMMARY

<u>BILLETS</u>	<u>ALLOWED</u>	<u>ON BOARD</u>	<u>LOSSES</u>	<u>GAINS</u>	<u>FUTURE</u>
CAPT	25	25	5	1	21
CDR	42	57	15	8	50
LCDR	28	24	11	9	22
LT-ENS	8	13	1	1	13
TOTALS	103	119	32	19	106

Total billets allowed will be increased by one CDR on establishment of Human Resources Management billet.



NSC

CDR R.K. LOCKWOOD	1110	1110	CDR	6/74	CDR J.A. MAJOR	1110	Stu
LCDR J.A. MORIARTY	1310	3100	LCDR	9/74	LCDR L. ANDERSON	3100	8/74
LCDR J.A. LOFTUS	1110	1110	LCDR	7/74	LCDR E.L. GIBSON	1110	Stu

ADMIN

CDR J.B. MOORE	1630	1630	LCDR	7/74	LCDR G.C. STEIGER	1630	Stu
CDR T.J. MORAN	1310	Excess		6/74	None		
CDR C.F. AKE	1110	1100	LCDR	7/74	CDR L.L. ALLEY	1110	5/74

CCE

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CWG

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Empty		1310	LCDR	-	LT P.P. GUTELIUS	1110	4/74
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Total billets allowed will be increased by one CDR on establishment of Human

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600170004-5

	CAPT				CDR				LCDR			LT-ENS			TOTALS
	1000	11XX	13XX	Other	1000	11XX	13XX	Other	11XX	13XX	Other	11XX	13XX	Other	
PREP															
On Bd															
All															
On Bd	1					1			1			2			3
On Bd						1			1			2			4
On Bd						2			1			1			3
On Bd						2			1			1			4
On Bd	1				3		1					2			6
On Bd					2		2		1			1			6
On Bd	2					3		3		1		2			11
On Bd	4	2	2			4	1		1			1			11
On Bd	4	3	2	1		9	1					1			12
On Bd	5	4	1	1											2
On Bd	2				2										4
On Bd						1	2								2
On Bd	2		1			1		1				1			4
On Bd						1			1			1			3
On Bd	1					1	1		1						3
On Bd						1			1						2
On Bd	4			1	3		1	1	2			2	1		11
On Bd						3	2	3				2			11
On Bd					3		1	1	1						6
On Bd							3		2						5
On Bd	1					1			2						3
On Bd						3	3	1	4			1			11
On Bd					4	3	3		9	4	1				23
On Bd						6	7	1	4	3	1	1			23
On Bd					1										1
On Bd						1									1
On Bd						1									1
On Bd	18	3	2	2	18	10	8	6	17	7	4	7	1		108
On Bd		13	10	2		29	20	8	12	9	3	13			111
All			25			42				28		8			100
On Bd			25			57				24		13			113

Desig)

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600170004-5

<u>RANK/NAME</u>	<u>DESIG</u>	<u>DESIG</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>PRD</u>	<u>RELIEF</u>	<u>DESIG</u>	<u>ETA</u>
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